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Abstract
Cryptographic protocols can be divided into (1) protocols where the protocol steps are simple from a computational point
of view and can thus be modeled by simple means, for instance, by single rewrite rules—we call these protocols non-loop-
ing—and (2) protocols, such as group protocols, where the protocol steps are complex and typically involve an iterative or
recursive computation—we call them recursive. While much is known on the decidability of security for non-looping proto-
cols, only little is known for recursive protocols. In this paper, we prove decidability of security (with respect to the standard
Dolev–Yao intruder) for a core class of recursive protocols and undecidability for several extensions. The key ingredient
of our protocol model is speciﬁcally designed tree transducers which work over inﬁnite signatures and have the ability to
generate new constants (which allow us to mimic key generation). The decidability result is based on an automata-theoretic
construction which involves a new notion of regularity, designed to work well with the inﬁnite signatures we use.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In most cryptographic protocols, principals are described by a ﬁxed sequence of what we call receive–send
actions. When performing such an action, a principal receives a message from the environment and, after some
internal computation, reacts by returning a message to the environment. Research on automatic protocol anal-
ysis [34,2,5,26] has concentrated on protocols where a receive–send action can basically be described by a single
rewrite rule of the form t → t′: when receiving a message m, the message (t′) is returned as output provided
that  is the matcher for t and m, i.e., (t) = m. In other words, an input message is processed by applying
the rewrite rule once on the top-level. We call receive–send actions of this kind and protocols based on such
receive–send actions non-looping. It has been proved that for non-looping protocols when analyzed with respect
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to a ﬁnite number of receive–send actions and the standard Dolev–Yao intruder where the message size is not
bounded, security (more precisely, secrecy) is decidable even when principals can perform equality tests on arbi-
trary messages [34,2,5,26], complex keys are allowed [34,5,26], and the free term algebra assumption is relaxed
by algebraic properties of various operators, such as exclusive or (XOR), Difﬁe-Hellman exponentiation, and
RSA encryption [8,13,9,36,10].
The main question we are concerned with in this paper is in how far security is decidable for protocols
where receive–send actions are complex and typically involve an iterative or recursive computation; we call such
receive–send actions and protocols containing such actions recursive.
To illustrate the kind of receive–send actions performed in recursive protocols, let us consider the key dis-
tribution server S of the Recursive Authentication (RA) Protocol [7]. In this protocol, the server S needs to
perform the following recursive receive–send action: the server S ﬁrst receives an a priori unbounded sequence
of requests of pairs of principals whowant to share session keys. Then, S generates session keys, and ﬁnally sends
a sequence of certiﬁcates (corresponding to the requests) containing the session keys. Receive–send actions of
this kind are typical for group protocols, but also occur in protocols such as the Internet Key Exchange protocol
(IKE)—see [25] for a description of some recursive protocols. As pointed out by [25] and illustrated in [39,17],
modeling recursion is security relevant.
A natural way to describe recursive receive–send actions is by tree transducers, which extend the class of
transductions expressible by single rewrite rules (with linear left-hand side). More precisely, to study decid-
ability, in Section 2 we introduce non-deterministic top-down tree transducers (TTAC’s) with look-ahead and
ε-transitions which work with a signature containing an inﬁnite set of what we call anonymous constants (AC’s),
over which the TTAC’s has only very limited control. TTAC’s can generate new (anonymous) constants, a fea-
ture often needed to model recursive receive–send actions; in the RA protocol, for instance, the key distribution
server needs to generate (an a priori unbounded number of) session keys.
The main result of this paper is that (1) security (for a ﬁnite number of receive–send actions, atomic keys, and
the standard Dolev–Yao intruder where the message size is not bounded) is decidable if receive–send actions
are modeled by TTAC’s (Section 5), and that (2) certain features of models for non-looping protocols cannot
be added without losing decidability: As soon as TTAC’s are equipped with the ability to perform equality tests
between arbitrarymessages, as soon as complex keys are allowed, or as soon as the free term algebra assumption
is relaxed by adding XOR or Difﬁe-Hellman exponentiation security is undecidable (Section 6).
The undecidability results are obtained by reductions from Post’s Correspondence Problem. The decidability
result is obtained in two steps. First, we show that TTAC’s are powerful enough to simulate the intruder. This
allows us to describe attacks as the composition of transducers. We can then reduce the security problem to
the iterated pre-image word problem for TTAC’s, which we show to be decidable (Section 3). Given a term t,
a “regular set” R of terms, and a sequence of TTAC’s, the iterated pre-image word problem asks whether on
input t the composition of the TTAC’s can produce an output in R. Here, “regular set” means a set of terms
recognizable by a new kind of tree automata, tree automata over signatures with anonymous constants (TAAC’s),
which can compare anonymous constants for equality.
1.1. Related work
Recursive protocols, such as the RA protocol and the A-GDH.2 protocol [3], have been analyzed
manually [33] and semi-automatically using theorem provers or special purpose tools [32,6,24].
Decidability for recursive protocols has initially been investigated in [20]. However, there are signiﬁcant
differences to the present paper. First, in [20] word transducers are employed, which are less powerful than tree
transducers. As a result, tree transducers provide a clearer picture of the differences between recursive and non-
looping protocols, and also allow to trace a tighter boundary of decidability. Second, generating new constants
(e.g., session keys) has not been considered in [20]. Third, TTAC-based models of (recursive) protocols are in
general much more precise than models based on word transducers because session keys can be generated and
nonces need not necessarily be typed; in Section 7 this is illustrated for the RA protocol. Fourth, the proof
techniques employed are different. In [20], a quite involved and technical pumping argument is used to obtain
decidability since word transducers are not powerful enough to simulate the intruder. In the current paper,
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the characterization of attacks in terms of the composition of transducers allows a more elegant proof, and
anonymous constants present a completely new challenge.
Recently, Truderung [38] proposed an alternative model for recursive protocols in which he shows that secu-
rity is NEXPTIME-complete. Instead of transducers, he uses what he calls selecting theories, which are certain
classes of Horn clauses, to model recursive receive–send actions. The expressivity of these theories is orthogonal
to the expressivity of our transducers. On the one hand, selecting theories can only output sequences of simply
structured messages, while transducers can produce much more complex messages. For instance, transducers
can produce output of size unrelated to the size of the input. In Truderung’s model the output size is linear in
the input size. Also, new constants cannot be generated, and hence, session key generation can only be approxi-
mated. On the other hand, selecting theories allow to test arbitrary messages for equality. The proof techniques
applied by Truderung are very different from the ones employed in the present paper. While we, as explained,
use automata-theoretic techniques, the techniques employed by Truderung are closer to those for non-looping
protocols. In [21], Truderung’s model has been extended to include the exclusive OR (XOR) and decidability
and undecidability results have been shown in this extended model.
In various papers, automata-theoretic techniques have been applied to the analysis of cryptographic proto-
cols (see, e.g., [27,18,19,12]). However, these works aim at analyzing non-looping protocols with respect to an
unbounded number of sessions and do not seem to be applicable to recursive protocols in an obvious way. To
the best of our knowledge, the work in [20] and the present work are the ﬁrst to employ transducers (over inﬁnite
signatures) for protocol analysis. Automata and transducers over inﬁnite signatures (although quite different
from those considered here) have been studied in the context of type checking and type inference for XML
queries with data values (see, e.g., [1,29]).
1.2. Structure of the paper
In Section 2, we introduce the mentioned tree automata (TAAC’s) and transducers (TTAC’s) over signatures
with anonymous constants and prove basic properties. Section 3 provides the deﬁnition of the iterated pre-image
word problem and the proof that this problem is decidable for TTAC’s. Our tree transducer-based protocol
model is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we show that security in this model is decidable. The purpose of
Section 6 is (1) to brieﬂy discuss the relationship between our model and models for non-looping protocols,
and (2) to prove the aforementioned undecidability results. Section 7 contains formal TTAC-based models of
the Recursive Authentication Protocol and the Needham Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol. We
conclude in Section 8.
1.3. Basic deﬁnitions and notation
A symbol is an object with an arity assigned to it. A symbol of arity 0 is called a constant (symbol).A signature
is a set of symbols. When  denotes a signature, then n denotes the set of symbols from  with arity n.
The set of terms over a signature  is denoted T. For a set C of constant symbols disjoint from a signature
, we set T(C) = T∪C .
We ﬁx an inﬁnite supply X of variables among which we ﬁnd x0, x1, x2, . . . For n  0, we write T n for the set
of all terms in T({x0, . . . , xn−1}). A term t ∈ T n is linear if every xi with i < n occurs at most once in t. When
t ∈ T n and t0, . . . , tn−1 are arbitrary terms, we write t[t0, . . . , tn−1] for the term which is obtained from t by simul-
taneously substituting ti for xi , for every i < n. A substitution over  is a function : T(X) → T(X) such that
for each term t, (t) is obtained from t by simultaneously substituting (x) for x, for every x ∈ X .
By ∗ we denote the set of ﬁnite strings over the non-negative integers . The empty string is denoted ε.
As usual, v ∈ ∗ is called a preﬁx of w ∈ ∗ if there exists v′ ∈ ∗ such that w = vv′ where vv′ denotes the
concatenation of v and v′. A set S ⊆ ∗ is called preﬁx closed if with v ∈ S every preﬁx of v belongs to S .
We use the notions “term” and “tree” interchangeably since a term t can be seen as a tree. Formally, a tree is
a mapping from a non-empty, ﬁnite, and preﬁx closed set S ⊆ ∗ into  such that if t() ∈ n for some n  0
and  ∈ S , then {i | i ∈ S} = {0, . . . , n− 1}, and if t() is a variable, then {i | i ∈ S} = ∅. We call S the set of
positions of t and denote this set by P(t).
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For a term t and  ∈ P(t), t| shall denote the subterm of t at position , i.e., P(t|) = {′ | ′ ∈ P(t)} and
t|(′) = t(′) for every ′ ∈ P(t|).
A subset  of T × T is called a transductionover. For a term t, we deﬁne (t) = {t′ | (t, t′) ∈ }. If  and ′ are
transductions over, then their composition  ◦ ′ deﬁnes the transduction {(t, t′) | ∃t′′((t, t′′) ∈ ′ ∧ (t′′, t′) ∈ )},
i.e., the composition is read from right to left. Given a transduction  over  and a set R ⊆ T, the pre-image of
R under  is the set −1(R) = {t | ∃t′ ∈ R with (t, t′) ∈ }.
2. Tree automata and tree transducers with anonymous constants
In this section, we describe the models of tree automata and transducers that we use, completely indepen-
dent of the application we have in mind, as they are of general interest. Before deﬁning our tree automata and
transducers, we introduce signatures with anonymous constants.
2.1. Signatures and anonymous constants
A pair (,C) consisting of a ﬁnite signature  and an arbitrary inﬁnite set C of constant symbols disjoint
from is called a signature with anonymous constants; the elements of andC are referred to as regular symbols
and anonymous constants, respectively. With such a signature, we associate the signature  ∪ C , denoted C .
That is, when we speak of a term over (,C) we mean a term overC . In what follows, let occC(t) denote the set
of elements from C that occur in the term t; similarly, let occC(S) denote the set of elements from C that occur
in any term of a set of terms S .
2.2. Tree automata over signatures with anonymous constants
Our tree automata are non-deterministic bottom-up tree automata that accept trees over signatures with
anonymous constants; they have full control over the regular symbols but only very limited control over the
anonymous constants. For instance, it will be the case that with every tree such an automaton accepts, it accepts
every treewhich is obtained from this one just by permuting—consistently renaming—the anonymous constants.
Our tree automata have two distinguished states, qd and qs, which are used as initial states for the anony-
mous constants: In every run on a tree t ∈ TC , the automaton ﬁrst non-deterministically assigns qd and qs to
the anonymous constants that occur in t in an arbitrary way under the restriction that at most one anonymous
constant, which is then called the selected constant, gets assigned qs and all the others get assigned qd , the default
value. Note that different occurrences of the same anonymous constant in t get assigned the same state, qd or
qs. Once these states have been assigned to the anonymous constants, the rest of the run of the automaton on t
proceeds in the standard bottom-up fashion.
Formally, a tree automaton (TAAC) over a signature with anonymous constants (,C) is a tuple
A = (Q, qd , qs,, F) (1)
where Q is a non-empty ﬁnite set of states, qd ∈ Q is the default state, qs ∈ Q is the selecting state,  is a ﬁnite
set of transitions as speciﬁed below, and F ⊆ Q is a set of ﬁnal states. If the set of ﬁnal states is omitted, we speak
of a semi TAAC.
Formally, transitions are pairs of a certain type, but for better reading, we write a transition (t, q) as t → q.
There are two types of transitions: A consuming transition is of the form
f(q0, . . . , qn−1) → q
where f ∈ n, q, q0, . . . , qn−1 ∈ Q; an ε-transition is of the form
q → q′
where q′, q ∈ Q.
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We call a TAAC deterministic if it does not contain ε-transitions and if for every f ∈ n and q0, . . . , qn−1 ∈ Q
there exists at most one q ∈ Q such that f(q0, . . . , qn−1) → q ∈ .
Each TAAC over a signature with anonymous constants (,C) deﬁnes a set of trees from T(C). To describe
this set, we view the setQ as a set of constants and deﬁne for each term t ∈ T(C ∪ Q) the set [t]A of states which
the automaton reaches after having read the term t.
We ﬁrst give an inductive deﬁnition for terms t ∈ T(Q) without anonymous constants. In this case, [t]A is
the smallest set satisfying the following rules:
– If t ∈ Q, then t ∈ [t]A.
– If t = f(t0, . . . , tn−1) and there exist q0, . . . , qn−1 with f(q0, . . . , qn−1) → q ∈  and qi ∈ [ti]A for every i < n,
then q ∈ [t]A.
– If q ∈ [t]A and q → q′ ∈ , then q′ ∈ [t]A.
A permitted substitution  is a function :C → {qd , qs} where at most one element of C gets assigned qs. Now,
for an arbitrary t ∈ T(C ∪ Q), we set
[t]A =
⋃
 permitted
[(t)]A.
The tree language recognized by A is the language
T(A) = {t ∈ T(C) | F ∩ [t]A /= ∅}.
We say that a tree language over C is TAAC-recognizable over (,C) if it is recognized by some TAAC over
(,C).
Before we provide some examples of (non) TAAC-recognizable languages, we introduce a notation which
we will use later. Given a term t ∈ T n
C
and sets S0, . . . , Sn−1 ⊆ Q, we write
[t[S0, . . . , Sn−1]]A =
⋃
(q0,...,qn−1)∈S0×...×Sn−1
[t[q0, . . . , qn−1]]A.
Example 1. Assume2 = {f } andi = ∅ for every i /= 2. Let T= = {f(c, c) | c ∈ C}. This language is recognized
by a TAAC with only three states, say q0, q1, and q2. We choose qd = q0 and qs = q1, F = {q2} and have only
one transition, namely f(q1, q1) → q2.
Example 2. Fix any signature (,C)with anonymous constants. For every i  3, let Ti be the tree language over
C which contains a tree t iff in t at least i pairwise distinct anonymous constants occur. Then, it is easy to see
that Ti is TAAC-recognizable over (,C) for i  2, but not for i = 3: for i = 0, the TAAC should accept every
tree. For i = 1, one deﬁnes a TAAC with a distinguished state q = qd = qs to which anonymous constants are
mapped. The TAAC checks whether this state occurs in a run on a tree at least once to make sure that the tree
contains at least one anonymous constant. For i = 2, the TAAC has states qd and qs with qd = qs and checks
whether both qd and qs occur in a run on a tree. The negative result for i = 3 immediately follows from Lemma
3, which in particular implies that if a TAAC accepts f(c, g(c′, c′′)) for anonymous constants c, c′, c′′, then it
also accepts one of f(c, g(c′′, c′′)), f(c′′, g(c′, c′′)), and f(c′, g(c′, c′′)).
To state the mentioned lemma, we need the notion of c-equivalent terms. Let t and t′ be arbitrary terms
and c an anonymous constant. Now, t and t′ are c-equivalent if they coincide except for occurrences of anon-
ymous constants other than c, i.e., t and t′ are c-equivalent if there is a term u and substitutions  and ′
with (X), ′(X) ⊆ C \ {c} such that (u) = t and ′(u) = t′. For example, f(c, g(c′, c′′)) and f(c, g(c′′, c′′′)) are
c-equivalent but f(c, g(c′, c′′)) and f(c′, g(c, c′′)) are not.
Lemma 3. Let T be a TAAC recognizable language and t ∈ T. Then there exists an anonymous constant c such that
t′ ∈ T for every tree t′ which is c-equivalent to t.
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Proof (sketch).LetA be a TAAC recognizing T . Take for c the constant which gets assigned qs in some accepting
run of A on T . Now, the claim follows easily. 
Another example of TAAC-recognizable languages is the following class of languages:
Example 4. Fix any signature (,C) with anonymous constants. For every i, let Ti be the tree language over
C which contains a tree t iff in t there are at least i occurrences of (not necessarily different) anonymous
constants. Then, Ti is TAAC-recognizable over (,C) for every i. Indeed, Ti is recognized by the TAAC A =
({0, . . . , i, q}, q, q,, {i}) where for every f ∈ n and states q1, . . . , qn ∈ {0, . . . , i, q},  contains the transition
f(q1, . . . , qn) → j where j = min(i, #{l | ql = q} +∑l∈{1,...,n},ql =q ql). That is, anonymous constants are assigned
to q and A counts the number of q’s up to i. If i is reached at the root of the tree, the tree is accepted.
The above TAAC is what we call a weak TAAC. A TAAC is called weak (WTAAC) if the default and the
selecting state are identical, i.e., qd = qs. This means that there actually is no selecting state. WTAAC’s are really
weaker because it is easy to see that, for instance, T= is not WTAAC-recognizable over (,C).
We conclude this section by summarizing basic properties of TAAC’s and WTAAC’s. We start with a simple
observation, which can be proved using a straightforward powerset construction.
Lemma 5. Every TAAC is equivalent to a deterministic TAAC. The same holds true for WTAAC’s.
But observe that for TAAC’s, there is still non-determinism involved because of the freedom to choose which
anonymous constant is assigned qs.
In the following lemma, we consider closure properties of TAAC’s as well as WTAAC’s. As we will see, the
behavior of TAAC’s is quite different from that of tree automata over ﬁnite signatures.
Lemma 6. Let (,C) be a signature with anonymous constants. Then:
(1) The set of tree languages over (,C) recognized by WTAAC’s over (,C) is closed under union, intersection,
and complementation.
(2) The set of tree languages over (,C) recognized by TAAC’s over (,C) is closed under union.
(3) The set of tree languages over (,C) recognized by TAAC’s over (,C) is closed under complementation iff
 = 0 ∪1. The same holds true for intersection.
Proof. (1) This can be proved just as for bottom-up tree transducers: closure under union follows from clo-
sure under intersection and complementation; closure under intersection is shown using a standard product
construction; closure under complementation follows from Lemma 5, because complementing a deterministic
WTAAC can be achieved by complementing its set of ﬁnal states.
(2) Let A0 = (Q0, qd0 , qs0,0, F0) and A1 = (Q1, qd1 , qs1 ,1, F1) be TAAC’s. We want to show that T(A0) ∪ T(A1)
is recognized by some TAAC. Basically, we construct the product automaton ofA0 andA1 and use the following
equivalence: Given a tree t, there exists a permitted substitution  such that A0 or A1 accepts (t) iff there exists
a permitted substitution 0 such that A0 accepts (t) or there exists a permitted substitution 1 such that A1
accepts 1(t).
More precisely, to construct a TAAC that recognizes T(A0) ∪ T(A1), we ﬁrst make A0 and A1 complete as fol-
lows: (i) We add new states s0 and s1 to A0 and A1, respectively, and ii) for every f ∈ n, q0, . . . , qn−1 ∈ Qi ∪ {si}
we add f(q0, . . . , qn−1) → si to the set of transitions of Ai for i = 0, 1. Let’s denote the resulting automata by A2
and A3, respectively. We clearly have T(Ai) = T(Ai+2) for i < 2. In the second step, we construct the following
product automaton:
(Q2 × Q3, (qd2 , qd3), (qs2, qs3),, (F0 × Q3) ∪ (Q2 × F1))
with (q2, q3) → (q′2, q′3) ∈  if q2 → q′2 ∈ 2 and q3 = q′3, or q2 = q′2 and q3 → q′3 ∈ 3, and f((q12, q13), . . . ,
(qn2, q
n
3)) → (q, q′) iff(q12, . . . , qn2) → q ∈ 2 andf(q13, . . . , qn3) → q′ ∈ 3 forf ∈ n. Clearly, the resultingTAAC
recognizes T(A2) ∪ T(A3) = T(A0) ∪ T(A1).
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(3)First of all, if = 0 ∪1 andA is aTAACover (,C), thenT(A) = T((Q, qd , qd ,, F)) ∪ T((Q, qs, qs,, F))
since terms over (,C) can only contain at most one anonymous constant, and hence, in a run on such a term
this constant is either assigned qd or qs. Both these automata are WTAAC’s, so by (1). we know that T(A) is
recognized by a WTAAC, and, again by 1, so is its complement. This proves one direction of the implication.
We now show that TAAC’s are not closed under complementation and intersection if there is a binary symbol
in , say f . It is straightforward to extend this to any signature with at least one symbol of arity  2. In what
follows, let #c(t) denote the number of occurrences of c in t.
For every n  1, we deﬁne the tree language
Ln = {f(t, t′) ∈ TC | ∃c(c ∈ C ∧ #c(t) = #c(t′) modn)}.
It is easy to see that Ln is TAAC-recognizable for every n  1 through a construction similar to Example 4.
However, we show that neither L2 = TC \ L2 nor L2 ∩ L3 are TAAC-recognizable.
By contradiction, assume that T = TC \ L2 is recognized by some TAAC A as in (1). Then this automa-
ton would accept the term t = f(f(c0, c1), f(c0, c1)) for two distinct anonymous constants c0 and c1. Let c be
a constant such that the assignment qs → c yields an accepting run for t. We proceed by a case distinction. If
c /∈ {c0, c1}, then A has an accepting run on t that does not distinguish between c0 and c1, and hence, f(f(c0, c0),
f(c0, c1)) ∈ T—a contradiction. If c = c0, we have f(f(c0, c1), f(c0, c2)) ∈ T for a new constant c2—a contradic-
tion. And if c = c1, we have f(f(c0, c1), f(c2, c1)) ∈ T for a new constant c2—again a contradiction.
Nowassume that there exists aTAACA recognizingL2 ∩ L3.For c ∈ C andn  2, let tnc = f(c, f(c, · · · f(c, c)))
such that #c(tnc ) = n. Let c0 and c1 be two distinct anonymous constants. Obviously, t = f(f(t3c0 , t2c1), f(t6c0 , t4c1)) ∈
L2 ∩ L3. Just as above, by considering different cases for c, one shows that variants of t are recognized by A
although they do not belong to L2 ∩ L3, which leads to a contradiction. 
We ﬁnally note that for TAAC’s the word and emptiness problem are decidable:
Lemma 7. The word and the emptiness problem are decidable for TAAC’s, and thus, WTAAC’s.
Proof. For the word problem—which asks whether given a term and a TAAC, the TAAC recognizes the term—
this is obvious. For the emptiness problem—which asks whether given a TAAC, the language recognized by the
TAAC is empty—one can show by the usual pumping argument on bottom-up tree automata that if a TAAC
recognizes a tree then also a tree of depth bounded by the number of states of the TAAC, and, clearly, only two
ﬁxed different anonymous constants have to be considered (one for qs and one for qd ). Now, decidability of the
emptiness problem easily follows. 
2.3. Tree transducers over signatures with anonymous constants
Tree transducers come in many different ﬂavors. Our model is designed in such a way that (1) the pre-image
of a TAAC-recognizable language is TAAC-recognizable again and (2) we can (easily) model the cryptographic
protocols and the adversary we want to. These two goals are opposed to each other: to achieve (1), the model
needs to be weak, to achieve (2), it needs to be strong. An important aspect of (2) is that it will be necessary that
an unbounded number of anonymous constants may be introduced by a tree transducer, but only in a very weak
fashion.
Our model is a top-down tree transducer, that is, a given tree is transformed into a new tree according to
certain rewrite rules, which are applied from the root of the tree to its leaves. It has several speciﬁc features:
– a WTAAC look-ahead,
– a mechanism for generating new anonymous constants, and
– a register for one anonymous constant.
In addition, our tree transducers may be non-deterministic and may contain ε-transitions.
To deﬁne our transducers, we need some more notation. We ﬁx a signature (,C)with anonymous constants
and a ﬁnite set S of states, whose elements we view as binary symbols. We assume that we are given a set
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V = {vR, vN } of two variables for anonymous constants: vR represents the aforementioned register, vN refers to
a newly generated anonymous constant.
A state term is of the form s(z, t) for s ∈ S , z ∈ C ∪ {∗, vR, vN }, and t ∈ T(C ∪ X). The term t is called the core
term of the state term. If z belongs to some set D ⊆ C ∪ {∗, vR, vN }, then we say s(z, t) is a D-state term.
Intuitively, a state term of the form s(∗, t) or s(c, t) with c ∈ C is part of a conﬁguration of a transducer and
means that the transducer is about to read t starting in state s where the register does not store a value or stores
the anonymous constant c, respectively. To describe transitions we use state terms of the form s(vR, t), s(vN , t),
and again s(∗, t), but not s(c, t). We now deﬁne our tree transducers and their computation formally, along with
examples.
Formally, a tree transducer (TTAC) over a signature with anonymous constants (,C) is a tuple
T = (S , I ,A,) (2)
where S is a ﬁnite set of states, I ⊆ S is a set of initial states, A is a semi WTAAC over (,C), the look-ahead
automaton, and  is a ﬁnite set of transitions as described below.
A transition is of the form
s(z, t) →q t′[vR, vN , t′0, . . . , t′r−1] (3)
where
(1) q ∈ Q is the look-ahead, with Q the set of states of A,
(2) s(z, t) is an {vR, ∗}-state term (recall that this means that z = vR or z = ∗) with t ∈ T n and t linear,
(3) t′ ∈ T r+2 (not necessarily linear), where vR does not occur in t′[vR, vN , t′0, . . . , t′r−1] if z = ∗, and
(4) each t′i is either a variable occurring in t or a {z, vN , ∗}-state term with the core term being a subterm of t.
Observe that the condition in (3) is not a real restriction, it is just to make the formalism well deﬁned: if z = ∗,
the register is undeﬁned, which means it does not make any sense to use its content (vR) on the right-hand side
of the rule, so vR should not appear in it.
When vN occurs in t′[vR, vN , t0, . . . , tr−1], then the transition is called generative, and non-generative otherwise.
Sometimes we omit the look-ahead q when we write transitions. This is equivalent to assuming that the look-
ahead is some state q in which A accepts every term. If A does not contain such a state, then A can be extended
accordingly. For s ∈ S , we denote by T(s) the transducer T with s as its only initial state.
Before deﬁning the computation of TTAC’s formally, let us consider a simple example of a TTAC and its
computation (see Example 9 for a more complex setting).
Example 8. Let 0 = {d}, 1 = {f }, 2 = {g}, and  = 0 ∪1 ∪2. We consider a TTAC T over (,C) with
only one state s, no look-ahead, and the following transitions:
s(∗, f(x)) → g(s(vN , x), vN ), (4)
s(vR, f(x)) → g(s(vR, x), vR), (5)
s(vR, d) → vR. (6)
Assume that t = f(f(d)) is given as input toT. Then, the initial conﬁguration ofT is s(∗, t), whichmeans thatT is
in state s, is about to read t, and does not contain an anonymous constant in its register. The only transition that
can be applied to this conﬁguration is (4), where x is replaced by f(d) and vN is replaced by a newly generated
constant, say c. The result of applying (4) to s(∗, t) is the new conﬁguration g(s(c, f(d)), c). Now, (5) can be
applied to s(c, f(d)) where vR, the register variable, is replaced by c and x by d . (In general, the intermediate
output produced by a TTAC may contain several state terms and to these state terms transitions are applied
independently.) The result of applying (5) to s(c, f(d)) is g(s(c, d), c), and the overall output produced by T so far
is g(g(s(c, d), c), c). At this point, (6) can be applied to s(c, d) yielding the overall output g(g(c, c), c). This term
does not contain a state term and is considered an output ofT on input t. Note that sinceT could have generated
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other anonymous constants than c in the ﬁrst step of the computation, all terms of the form g(g(c′, c′), c′) with
c′ ∈ C are possible outputs of T.
The fact that TTAC’s may produce several different outputs for the same input is not only due to the fact
that anonymous constants cannot be distinguished. Even modulo renaming of anonymous constants, given one
input term, several outputs can be produced by a TTAC’s as TTAC’s may be non-deterministic. Also, since
TTAC’s may contain transitions which do not consume input symbols, the set of outputs may be inﬁnite even
modulo renaming of anonymous constants. Consider, for instance, the transition
s(vR, f(x)) → g(s(vR, f(x)), vR). (7)
This transition works as (5), but with one difference: it does not consume the input symbol f . Adding this
transition to T above and given the input term t from above, all terms of the form
g(g(· · · g(c, c) · · ·), c), c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n occurrences of g
for n  2 are possible outputs of T.
Formally, the computation a TTAC carries out is described by a sequence of rewriting steps. The corre-
sponding rewrite relation U is deﬁned with respect to a subset U ⊆ C of anonymous constants to ensure that
whenever the TTAC is supposed to generate a new constant this constant does not belong to U . Later U will
be the set of anonymous constants in the input term, which then guarantees that the anonymous constants
generated by the TTAC are different from those occurring in the input.
To deﬁne U , suppose we are given a term u0 = u1[s(c, u2)] where u2 = t[t0, . . . , tn−1] ∈ TC , and hence,
t ∈ TC ({x0, . . . , xn−1}) (see p. 5), and u1 is linear, and a transition  as in (3) with z = vR. Let  be the substitution
deﬁned by (xi) = ti . Then, if q ∈ [u2]A (i.e., the current input satisﬁes the look-ahead),
u0 U u1[t′[c, c′, (t′0), . . . , (t′r−1)]]
for every c′ ∈ C \ (occC(u0) ∪ U). Observe that if  is non-generative, c′ and U are irrelevant. Also note that
the newly generated anonymous constant does not occur in U and in the output term computed so far. The
rewriting step in case u0 = u1[s(∗, u2)] is deﬁned in the same way, but it is required that z = ∗.
A sequence s(∗, t) U t1 U t2 U . . . U t′ with t and t′ terms over (,C) is called a computation.
Let∗U denote the reﬂexive transitive closure ofU .We let t ∗ t′ be a short form for t ∗occC(t) t′. The relation
on T(C) deﬁned by the TTAC T is
T = {(t, t′) ∈ TC × TC | ∃s(s ∈ I ∧ s(∗, t) ∗ t′)}.
We say that a transduction  on (,C) is TTAC-realizable if there exists a TTAC T such that T = . We call
two TTAC’s equivalent if they realize the same transduction.
Let us look at another slightly more complex example.
Example 9. Let 0 = {d}, 1 = {f }, 2 = {g} and C be an inﬁnite set of anonymous constants. Consider the
transduction  on (,C) where (t, t′) ∈  if t does not contain f and t′ is obtained from t by replacing every
maximal subterm which does not contain anonymous constants by any term of the form g(f(f(. . . f(c) . . .)),
f(f(. . . f(c) . . .))) for anewanonymous constant c, where the arguments of gmaybeof anydepth anddonot need
to be equal, only the anonymous constant c needs to be the same in both arguments of g. Subterms of t that con-
tain an anonymous constant are simply copied. For example, a possible transduction of g(g(d , d), g(g(c′, c′, ), c′))
for an anonymous constant c′ is g(g(f(f(f(c))), f(c)), g(g(c′, c′), c′)) where c is a new anonymous constant, in
particular c = c′. We show that  is TTAC-realizable.
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Let A be the semi WTAAC with states qC , qR, qM , qf where qC is the default state and the transitions are:
d → qR,
g(qR, qR) → qR,
qC → qM ,
g(qR, qM ) → qM ,
g(qM , qR) → qM ,
g(qM , qM ) → qM ,
d → qf ,
qC → qf ,
g(qf , qf ) → qf .
Then qf ∈ [t]A iff f does not occur in t; qR ∈ [t]A iff t does not contain f nor anonymous constants; and
qM ∈ [t]A iff t does not contain f but an anonymous constant.
Now it is easy to construct the desired TTAC. We choose sI to be its initial state and use the following
transitions:
sI (∗, x0) →qf s0(∗, x0), (8)
s0(∗, x0) →qC x0, (9)
s0(∗, g(x0, x1)) →qM g(s0(∗, x0), s0(∗, x1)), (10)
s0(∗, x0) →qR g(sf (vN , x0), sf (vN , x0)), (11)
sf (vR, x0) → f(sf (vR, x0)), (12)
sf (vR, x0) → vR. (13)
Transition (8) is used to check whether the input term does not contain f . Transition (9) is applied if the input
term is an anonymous constant. This constant is simply copied into the output term. Transition (10) is applied if
the input term starts with g but contains an anonymous constant. Hence, this term is not replaced at this point
and the computation proceeds with the arguments of g. Transition (11) is applied if the current input term does
not contain an anonymous constant, and hence, since the TTAC processes terms top-down, the current input
term is a maximal subterm of the original input term without anonymous constants, and hence, is supposed to
be replaced by g(f(· · · f(c) · · ·), f(· · · f(c) · · ·)) for a new anonymous constant c, which in (11) is created using
vN . The transitions (12) and (13) are used to produce terms of the form f(· · · f(c) · · ·) where c is the anonymous
constant that was generated when transition (11) was applied.
A class C of transductions is closed under composition if for all transductions  and ′ we have that , ′ ∈ C
implies  ◦ ′ ∈ C. It is well known [16] that the set of transductions realized by non-deterministic top-down tree
transducers over ﬁnite signatures is not closed under composition. It is easy to see that this also holds true for
TTAC’s. One example illustrating this fact is the following: obviously, for g ∈ 1, one can deﬁne a TTAC T1
that on input a ∈ 0 generates gn(a) = g(g(· · · g(a))) for every n  0. Also, it is easy to construct a TTAC T2
that when given a term t as input outputs f(t, t). Now, on input a the transduction T2 ◦ T1 produces the tree
language {f(gn(a), gn(a)) | n  0}. By standard pumping arguments, it is easy to prove that no single TTAC can
produce such an output on input a.
Lemma 10. The set of TTAC-realizable transductions is not closed under composition.
3. The iterated pre-image word problem
The objective of this section is to prove that the iterated pre-image word problem is decidable. This problem
is deﬁned as follows:
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IteratedPreImage. Given a term t over (,C), a TAAC B over (,C), and a sequence of TTAC’s T0, . . . ,Tl−1
over (,C) with  = T0 ◦ · · · ◦ Tl−1 , decide whether t ∈ −1(T(B)).
The key for proving decidability of this problem is:
Theorem 11. The pre-image of a TAAC-recognizable tree language under a TTAC-realizable transduction is a
TAAC-recognizable tree language.Moreover, an appropriate TAAC can be constructed effectively.
Using this theorem, we immediately obtain:
Corollary 12. IteratedPreImage is decidable.
Proof. Given t, B, T0, . . . ,Tl−1, and  as above, by Theorem 11 it follows that a TAAC A recognizing −1(T(B))
can be constructed effectively. Since by Lemma 7 the word problem for TAAC’s is decidable, we can decide
whether t ∈ T(A), and thus, whether t ∈ −1(T(B)). 
The runtime of the decision procedure described in the proof of the corollary may be non-elementary since,
as we will see, the number of states of the TAAC constructed in the proof of Theorem 11 may be exponential in
the size of the input.
The proof of Theorem 11 is carried out in three steps. We ﬁrst show how TTAC’s can be turned into what we
call simple TTAC’s (Section 3.1).We then construct a TAAC recognizing the pre-image of a TAAC-recognizable
tree language under a simple TTAC (Section 3.2) and ﬁnally prove the correctness of this construction (Section
3.3).
3.1. Simple TTAC’s
We say that a transition of the form (3) is simple if
(1) the term t is either
(a) a variable—in this case we call the transition ε-transition—, or
(b) of the form f(x0, . . . , xn−1) for some f ∈ n—in this case we call the transition -transition—, and
(2) for every i < r, the term t′i is either a variable or a state term of the form s(z′, x′) where x′ is a variable
occurring in t.
We call a TTAC simple if it only contains simple transitions. Themain advantage of simple TTACs is that the
left-hand side of transitions of simple TTACs are ﬂat, and hence, their application is more local and applications
of different transitions do not overlap too much. This makes these transitions easier to handle and therefore
helps in the proof of Theorem 11.
Before we prove that every TTAC can be turned into an equivalent simple TTAC, we observe:
Lemma 13. For every linear term t ∈ T n
C
, there exists a WTAAC At over (,C) and a state, say qt , in At such that
qt is the only ﬁnal state of At and T(At ) = {t′ | there exists a substitution  such that (t) = t′}.
Proof. The proof can be carried out by a straightforward structural induction on t. 
Note that the lemma does not hold for non-linear terms.
We next show:
Lemma 14. Every TTAC is equivalent to a simple TTAC, which can be constructed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let T be a TTAC as in (2) and let  contain a non-simple transition of the form
s(z, t) →q t′[vR, vN , t′0, . . . , t′r−1, xi0 , . . . , xil−1 ] (14)
where the t′i are state terms and the xij are variables occurring in t.
We explain how (14) can be replaced by several simple transitions; by iterating this argument all non-simple
transitions of T can be replaced by simple transitions.
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The idea is as follows: we ﬁrst use an ε-transition to check the look-ahead q and nothing else. Then we extend
A by At (Lemma 13) to be able to check whether the input term matches with t. This is done in an ε-transition
with qt as look-ahead. Next, we take care of the most difﬁcult problem, namely eliminating occurrences of sub-
trees of t on the right-hand side. We simply encode the positions of these subtrees in appropriate states. Finally,
we add transitions for the states introduced in the previous step, which make sure that the subtrees of trees they
encode are processed in the right way.
In the ﬁrst step, we simply add the ε-transition
s(z, x) →q s′(z, x), (15)
where s′ is a new state. This transition does not change the input, but it can only be taken if the input satisﬁes
the look-ahead condition.
In the second step, we check that the input term matches t. Therefore, we add the states and the transitions
of At , assuming disjoint state sets. In addition, we add the ε-transition
s′(z, x) →qt s′′(z, x), (16)
where s′′ is another new state and qt is as in Lemma 13. This transition does not change the input either, but it
can only be taken if the input matches t.
In the third step, we encode references to subterms of t in new states. To this end, we add states of the form pq
and p for  ∈ P(t) and q ∈ S . We will later add transitions in such a way that these states satisfy the following
properties:
(1) p(z, t′′) ∗U t′′′ iff t′′| = t′′′, and, similarly,
(2) pq(z, t′′) ∗U t′′′ iff q(z, t′′|) ∗U t′′′,
for any choice of terms t′′ and t′′′, any choice of U ⊆ C , and any choice of z. Given these properties, it is now
easy to add the right transition. We assume that each t′i is of the form si(zi , t′′i ) and for each i we pick a position
i such that t′′i = t|i . (If there are several positions that satisfy this condition, any one will be good.) We also
pick for every j a position ′j such that xij = t|′j . Now we can add the following ε-transition:
s′′(z, x) → t′[vR, vN , ps00(z0, x), . . . , p
sr−1
r−1(zr−1, x), p′0(∗, x), . . . , p′l−1(∗, x)].
In the fourth step, we add the transitions that are needed to guarantee (1) and (2) from above. First, for every
f ∈ n, q ∈ Q, i < n, z ∈ {vR, ∗}, and  with i ∈ P(t) we add
p
q
i(z, f(x0, . . . , xn−1)) → pq(z, xi),
where, by convention, pqε = q. Similarly, for every f ∈ n, i < n, and  with i ∈ P(t) we add
pi(∗, f(x0, . . . , xn−1)) → p(∗, xi),
where, by convention, p(∗, xi) is replaced by xi in case  = ε.
It can now easily be veriﬁed that the new TTAC is equivalent to the original one, by induction on the length
of a computation. 
3.2. Construction of the TAAC recognizing the pre-image
Given a TAAC I (the image automaton) and a TTAC T, we construct a TAAC P (the pre-image automaton)
such that T(P) = −1
T
(T(I)). In Section 3.3, we then prove that our construction is correct.
In what follows, let
I = (QI , qd , qs,I , FI )
be a TAAC over (,C) and
T = (QT , IT ,A,T )
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be a TTAC over (,C) with
A = (QA, qdA, qdA,A)
as its look-ahead automaton. As mentioned, we want to construct a TAAC
P = (QP , qdP , qsP ,P , FP )
over (,C) such that
T(P) = −1
T
(T(I)).
Due to Lemma 14, we may assume that T is simple. Thus, we may assume that T consists of -transitions of
the form
q(z, f(x0, . . . , xn−1)) →qA t′[vR, . . . , vR, vN , . . . , vN , t′0, . . . , t′r−1, xi0 , . . . , xil−1 ] (17)
where t′ is linear, ij ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} for every j < l, t′i is a {vR, ∗}-state term of the form qi(zi , xji ) with ji ∈{0, . . . , n− 1}, and vR may only occur on the right-hand side of (17) if z = vR, and ε-transitions of the form
q(z, x) →qA t′[vR, . . . , vR, vN , . . . , vN , t′0, . . . , t′r−1, x, . . . , x] (18)
where t′ is linear, t′i is a {vR, ∗}-state term of the form qi(zi , x), and vR may only occur on the right-hand side of
(18) if z = vR. Note that assuming t′ to be linear is w.l.o.g. since we can duplicate the entries vR, vN , t′i , x, and xij .
Roughly speaking, the idea behind the construction of P is that in a run of P on t ∈ TC , P simulates the runs
of I on all possible outputs t′ of T on input t simultaneously. The problem is that runs of I are required to satisfy
a global condition, namely that the default and the selecting states qd and qs of I are assigned to constants in a
consistent way—by a permitted substitution. To capture this global condition in P, we use that runs of P also
meet such a global condition. More precisely, the permitted substitution in a run of P on t will determine the
permitted substitutions that are considered in the runs of I on the trees t′ in the following way:
(1) (“Yes” case) If in a run of P on t the state qsP is assigned to an anonymous constant c (occurring in t), then
in this run only those runs of I will be considered where qs is assigned to the same anonymous constant c and
qd is assigned to all other anonymous constants, in particular, to all the anonymous constants generated by
T.
(2) (“No” case) If in a run of P on t the state qdP is assigned to each anonymous constant occurring in t, then in
this run only those runs of I will be considered where qd is assigned to each anonymous constant occurring
in t′ except for at most one anonymous constant generated by T, which may get assigned qs.
In order to be able to distinguish between (1) and (2) and to make sure that in (2) at most one anonymous
constant gets assigned qs, the TAAC P does some book keeping.
We now provide the formal deﬁnition of P. In Section 3.3, we show that P in fact recognizes the pre-image.
State space of P. The state space of P is deﬁned by
QP = 2QI × 2QA × {yes,no} × 2QT×{qd ,qs ,∗}×QI × 2QT×{qd ,∗}×QI
whereweuse the followingnotation toaccess the individual componentsof a state.Fora stateb = (S ,L,	,Md ,Ms)
of P, we deﬁne:
– Iset(b) = S ,
– LA(b) = L,
– seen(b) = 	,
– D(q,s)(b) = {a | (q, s, a) ∈ Md } for every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , qs, ∗}, and
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– S(q,s)(b) = {a | (q, s, a) ∈ Ms} for every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , ∗}.
The intuitive meaning of the different components of a state b is as follows. The set Iset(b) collects the states
reachable by I on the input tree t to P. The set LA(b) collects the values of the look-ahead of T for the given
input tree t. The value seen(b) distinguishes between (1) and (2) above: if P has observed (seen) that we are
in case (1), then seen(b) = yes, and seen(b) = no otherwise. The other two components are more difﬁcult to
describe.
In D(q,s)(b) we collect all states reachable in a run of I on some output tree t′ obtained by running T on t
starting in state q where the register is undeﬁned (s = ∗), holds an anonymous constant which qd is assigned to
(s = qd ), or holds an anonymous constant which qs is assigned to (s = qs), where, in the two latter cases, the
constant is assumed not to belong to t. The runs of I on t′ are simulated with respect to a permitted substitution
that maps all constants generated by T to the default state qd—the capital D in D(q,s)(b) being reminiscent of
this—and coincides with the permitted substitution used in the run of P on all constants occurring in t.
The interpretation of S(q,s)(b) is similar: here, we assume that all constants in t are assigned to qd and in the
runs of I all permitted substitutions are considered which map all constants in t to qd and at most one new
constant to the selecting state qs—the capital S in S(q,s)(b) being reminiscent of this. The case where the register
is assigned to qs does not need to be considered.
Toprovide further intuition for these components, let us lookat an example.Assume thatTdoesnot contain ε-
transitions and exactly one transition with f ∈ 2 on the left-hand side, namely the transition q(vR, f(x, y)) →qA
g(vR, x, q′(vN , y)), where g ∈ 3, q, q′ are states of T, and x and y are variables. We refer to this transition by
(*). Furthermore, assume that P just read terms t0 and t1, resulting in states b0 and b1, respectively, and that P
is about to read f ∈ 2, i.e., the current conﬁguration of P is f(b0, b1). We consider the components D(q,s)(b)
and S(q,s)(b) in b. Clearly, we have that D(q′,s)(b) = ∅ and S(q′,s)(b) = ∅ for all q′ = q and all s ∈ {qs, qd , ∗} since
there is no transition in T with q′ and f on the left-hand side. In other words, when applied to some term with
head f in state q′, T does not produce output. Also, D(q,s)(b) = ∅ and S(q,s)(b) = ∅ if qA /∈ LA(b) since (*) is the
only transition in T with left-hand side containing f , but T cannot apply (*) if the look-ahead automaton of
T does not accept the term t = f(t0, t1) in state qA. Now, assume that qA ∈ LA(b). We have D(q,∗)(b) = ∅ and
S(q,∗)(b) = ∅ since the left-hand side of transition (*) contains vR instead of ‘*’. For D(q,qd )(b) we obtain the set
[g(qd , Iset(b0),D(q′,qd )(b1)]I. This is the set of states I can possibly be in after having read a term t′ produced by
T on input t in state q where in the run of I on some t′ all anonymous constants generated by T are assigned
to qd and the value of the register of T when starting to read t is assigned to qd as well. Similarly, we have that
D(q,qs)(b) = [g(qs, Iset(b0),D(q′,qd )(b1)]I. The only difference here is that in the run of I the value of the register of
Twhen starting to read t is assigned to qs, instead of qd . The component S(q,qd )(b) also contains those states I can
possibly be in after having read outputs t′ of T where an anonymous constant generated by T may be assigned
to qs. Therefore, we have that S(q,qd )(b) = [g(qd , Iset(b0),D(q′,qs)(b1)]I ∪ [g(qd , Iset(b0), S(q′,qd )(b1)]I. Note that by
distinguishing between the D- and S-components, we can keep track of where we allow anonymous constants
generated by T to be assigned to qs in runs of I and where we do not allowed such assignments. We ﬁnally note
that if T had ε-transitions, the components just described would have to be augmented since T could also apply
ε-transitions, and hence, produce more output terms. Below, we will therefore consider ε-closures of states of P.
The intuition behind the components of the states of P is formally captured in Lemma 17.
The ε-Closure. We need one more deﬁnition before we can proceed.
Given a transition as in (18), we write tεq′,q′′,b as abbreviation for the term
t′[q′, . . . , q′, q′′, . . . , q′′,D(q0,s0)(b), . . . ,D(qr−1,sr−1)(b), Iset(b), . . . , Iset(b)]
and, for k < r, tε,kq′,q′′,b as abbreviation for the term
t′[q′, . . . , q′, q′′, . . . , q′′,D(q0,s0)(b), . . . ,D(qk−1,sk−1)(b), S(qk ,sk )(b),D(qk+1,sk+1)(b),
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. . . ,D(qr−1,sr−1)(b), Iset(b), . . . , Iset(b)]
where in both cases si = ∗ if zi = ∗, si = q′ if zi = vR, and si = q′′ if zi = vN .
Given a transition as in (17) and states b0, . . . , bn−1 (they will be the states assigned to the arguments of f in
a run of P), we write tq′,q′′ as abbreviation for the term
t′[q′, . . . , q′, q′′, . . . , q′′,D(q0,s0)(bj0), . . . . . . ,D(qr−1,sr−1)(bjr−1), Iset(bi0), . . . , Iset(bil−1)]
and, for k < r, t,kq′,q′′ as abbreviation for the term
t′[q′, . . . , q′, q′′, . . . , q′′,D(q0,s0)(bj0), . . . . . . ,D(qk−1,sk−1)(bjk−1), S(qk ,sk )(bjk ),D(qk+1,sk+1)(bjk+1), . . .
. . . ,D(qr−1,sr−1)(bjr−1), Iset(bi0), . . . , Iset(bil−1)]
where again in both cases si = ∗ if zi = ∗, si = q′ if zi = vR, and si = q′′ if zi = vN .
Now we can deﬁne the ε-closure of a state of P. Let b ∈ QP . We deﬁne a sequence b0, b1, . . . by induction,
where, in the base case, we set b0 = b, and for i  0 we deﬁne the components of bi+1 as follows:
– Iset(bi+1) = Iset(b), LA(bi+1) = LA(b), seen(bi+1) = seen(b).
– For every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , qs, ∗}, the set D(q,s)(bi+1) is obtained from D(q,s)(bi) by adding all states a for
which there exists an ε-transition as in (18) such that qA ∈ LA(bi), z = ∗ iff s = ∗, and a ∈ [tεs,qd ,bi ]I.
– For every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , ∗}, the set S(q,s)(bi+1) is obtained from S(q,s)(bi) by adding all states a for which
there exists an ε-transition as in (18) such that qA ∈ LA(bi), z = ∗ iff s = ∗, and a ∈ [tεs,qs ,bi ]I or a ∈ [t
ε,k
s,qd ,bi
]I
for some k < r.
Clearly, there exists an index j such that bj = bj+1 = . . . We deﬁne the ε-closure of b to be bj for such a j and
denote it by b.
The Default and selecting states of P. The default state qdP of P is deﬁned as the ε-closure bd of the following
state bd :
– Iset(bd ) = [qd ]I, LA(bd ) = [qdA]A, seen(bd ) = no,
– D(q,s)(bd ) = ∅ for every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , qs, ∗},
– S(q,s)(bd ) = ∅ for every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , ∗}.
Similarly, the selecting state qsP of P is deﬁned as the ε-closure bs of the following state b
s:
– Iset(bs) = [qs]I, LA(bs) = [qdA]A, seen(bs) = yes,
– D(q,s)(bs) = ∅ for every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , qs, ∗},
– S(q,s)(bs) = ∅ for every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , ∗}.
Transitions of P. In what follows, by abuse of notation we write qd instead of qdP and q
s instead of qsP . In this
way, we can use the same permitted substitutions for both P and I. Recall that qd and qs are the default and the
selecting states of I, respectively.
For every f ∈ n and b0, . . . , bn−1 ∈ QP , the automaton P contains the transition f(b0, . . . , bn−1) → b where
b is deﬁned to be the ε-closure b′ of the following state b′ determined by the following three conditions.
– Iset(b′) = [f(Iset(b0), . . . , Iset(bn−1))]I, LA(b′)=[f(LA(b0), . . . ,LA(bn−1))]A, seen(b′) = yes if there exists i
such that seen(bi) = yes, and seen(b′) = no otherwise.
– For any q and s, we have a ∈ D(q,s)(b′) if there exists a -transition as in (17) such that qA ∈ LA(b′), z = ∗ iff
s = ∗, and a ∈ [t
s,qd
]I for every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , qs, ∗}.
– For any q and s, we have a ∈ S(q,s)(b′) if there exists a -transition as in (17) such that qA ∈ LA(b′), (z = ∗ iff
s = ∗), and a ∈ [ts,qs ]I or a ∈ [t,ks,qd ]I for some k for every q ∈ QT and s ∈ {qd , ∗}.
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Final states of P. The set of ﬁnal states FP of P contains a state b if there exists q ∈ IT and a ∈ FI such that
– seen(b) = yes and a ∈ D(q,∗)(b), or
– seen(b) = no and a ∈ S(q,∗)(b).
3.3. Correctness of the construction
The following proposition states that our construction is correct.
Proposition 15. T(P) = −1
T
(T(I)).
To prove this proposition, we need to prove two lemmas. The ﬁrst lemma, which immediately follows from
the construction, states that P is complete and deterministic, and that reachable states are ε-closed.
Lemma 16. For every t and permitted substitution , there exists a state b such that {b} = [(t)]P. This state b is
ε-closed, i. e., b = b.
The second lemma is more involved, and it is the key for proving Proposition 15. It formalizes all the intuition
behind our construction.
Lemma 17. For every term t ∈ TC , b ∈ QP , and permitted substitution  such that b ∈ [(t)]P the following is true,
where we write ′ =t  to say that ′ is a permitted substitution which coincides with  on occC(t).
(1) Iset(b) = [(t)]I.
(1) LA(b) = [t]A.
(3) The following are equivalent:
(A) seen(b) = yes.
(B) There exists c ∈ occC(t) such that (c) = qs.
(4) For every a ∈ QI and q ∈ QT , the following are equivalent:
(A) a ∈ D(q,∗)(b).
(B) There exists t′ ∈ TC and ′ such that ′ =t , ′(c) = qd for every c ∈ occC(t′) \ occC(t), a ∈ [′(t′)]I, and
q(∗, t) ∗ t′.
(5) For every a ∈ QI , q ∈ QT , and c /∈ occC(t), the following are equivalent:
(A) a ∈ D(q,qd )(b).
(B) There exists t′ ∈ TC and ′ =t  s.t. ′(c′) = qd for every c′ ∈ occC(t′) \ occC(t), ′(c) = qd , a ∈ [′(t′)]I,
and q(c, t) ∗ t′.
(6) If seen(b) = no, then for every a ∈ QI , q ∈ QT , c /∈ occC(t), the following are equivalent:
(A) a ∈ D(q,qs)(b).
(B) There exists t′ ∈ TC and ′ s.t. ′ =t , ′(c) = qs, a ∈ [′(t′)]I, and q(c, t) ∗ t′.
Note that (c′) = qd for every c′ ∈ occC(t) since seen(b) = no.
(7) If seen(b) = no, then for every a ∈ QI , q ∈ QT , the following are equivalent:
(A) a ∈ S(q,∗)(b).
(B) There exists t′ ∈ TC and ′ s.t. ′ =t , a ∈ [′(t′)]I, and q(∗, t) ∗ t′.
(8) If seen(b) = no, then for every a ∈ QI , q ∈ QT , c /∈ occC(t), the following are equivalent:
(A) a ∈ S(q,qd )(b).
(B) There exists t′ ∈ TC and ′ s.t. ′ =t , ′(c) = qd , a ∈ [′(t′)]I, and q(c, t) ∗ t′.
Before proving this lemma, we use it to prove Proposition 15.
Proof (Proposition 15).
T(P) ⊆ −1
T
(T(I)): Assume that t ∈ T(P). It follows that there exists a permitted substitution  and a ﬁnal
state b ∈ FP such that b ∈ [(t)]P. We consider two cases. First, assume that seen(b) = yes. Then, there exists
q ∈ IT and a ∈ FI such that a ∈ D(q,∗)(b). Lemma 17, (4) implies that there exists t′ and a permitted substitu-
tion ′ such that q(∗, t) ∗ t′ and a ∈ [′(t′)]I, and thus, t′ ∈ T(I) since a ∈ FI . This means that t ∈ −1T (T(I)).
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Second, assume that seen(b) = no. Then, there exists q ∈ IT and a ∈ FI such that a ∈ S(q,∗)(b). By Lemma 17,
(7) there exists t′ and a permitted substitution ′ such that q(∗, t) ∗ t′ and a ∈ [′(t′)]I. Thus, t′ ∈ T(I) and
t ∈ −1
T
(T(I)).
T(P) ⊇ −1
T
(T(I)): assume that t ∈ −1
T
(T(I)). This means that there exists t′, a ∈ FI , and a permitted substi-
tution  such that q(∗, t) ∗ t′ for some q ∈ IT and a ∈ [(t′)]I. Let b ∈ [(t)]P. Such a b exists and is uniquely
determined due to Lemma 16. We show that b ∈ FP , and thus, t ∈ T(P). First, assume that seen(b) = yes. Then,
by Lemma 17, (3) and since  is a permitted substitution, we have that (c) = qd for every c /∈ occC(t). By Lemma
17, (4), we can conclude that a ∈ D(q,∗)(b). Second, if seen(b) = no, Lemma 17, (7). implies that a ∈ S(q,∗)(b). In
both cases, we get b ∈ FP . 
Proof (Lemma 17). Let t ∈ TC , b ∈ QP , and  be a permitted substitution such that b ∈ [(t)]P. Statements (1),
(2), and (3) are easy to verify by the construction of P. We prove (4)–(8) simultaneously. We ﬁrst show the
implications from left to right by structural induction on t and then establish the other direction by induction
on the length of computations.
“⇒”: Base case. Assume that t ∈ C . We know that b = bd or b = bs. Let b0 = bd or b0 = bs; both cases can be
dealt with in the same way. For b0 the implications hold trivially. By induction on i, we show that they hold for
bi+1. We concentrate on (8) as it is one of the more interesting cases. The other inclusions can be shown analo-
gously. We assume that seen(b) = no and a ∈ S(q,qd )(bi+1). We need to show that there exists t′ and a permitted
substitution ′ such that ′ =t , ′(c) = qd , q(c, t) ∗ t′, and a ∈ [′(t′)]I. If a ∈ S(q,qd )(bi), this follows by the
induction hypothesis. Otherwise, by deﬁnition of S(q,qd )(bi+1), we know that there exists an ε-transition as in (18)
such that qA ∈ LA(bi), z = vR, and a ∈ [tεqd ,qs ,bi ]I or a ∈ [t
ε,k
qd ,qd ,bi
]I for some k . First suppose that a ∈ [tεqd ,qs ,bi ]I.
Then, there exist aj ∈ D(qj ,sj)(bi) such that a ∈ [t′[qd , . . . , qd , qs, . . . , qs, a0, . . . , ar−1, Iset(bi), . . . , Iset(bi)]]I. Let
c′ /∈ occC(t) ∪ {c} and ci = ∗ if zi = ∗, ci = c if zi = vR, and ci = c′ if zi = vN . Deﬁne ′(c′) = qs and ′(c′′) = qd
for every c′′ = c′. Note that ′ =t  and ′(c) = qd . Using the induction hypothesis on i, it is easy to ver-
ify that there exist t′0, . . . , t
′
r−1 such that qj(cj , t) ∗ t′j , aj ∈ [′(t′j)]I, and the t′j are chosen in such a way that
new constants generated in the computation qj(cj , t) ∗ t′j are different from c, c′, the constants occurring
in t, and those that are generated in qj′(cj′ , t) ∗ t′j′ for j′ = j. Note that to establish the existence of the
t′j with the above properties, we can in fact use ′ as the permitted substitution for every j. Thus, we have
q(c, t) ∗ t′[c, . . . , c, c′, . . . , c′, t′0, . . . , t′r−1, t, . . . , t] := t′′ and a ∈ [′(t′′)]I. The case where a ∈ [tε,kqd ,qd ,bi ]I for some
k can be dealt with in an analogous fashion. This concludes the proof of the base case.
What we have basically shown here is that if the implications hold for some state, then they hold for the
ε-closure of this state. The fact that t is an anonymous constant was only used to show the implication for
b0.
Induction step. Assume that t = f(t0, . . . , tn−1) and that the inclusions hold true for the subterms ti of t.
Let bi be the unique element with bi ∈ [(ti)]P. Similar to the base case, one can show that the inclusions
hold for b′ where b′ is deﬁned as in the deﬁnition of transitions of P. Moreover, from the proof of the base
case it follows that the inclusions stay true when taking the ε-closure of a state. Thus, they hold true for
b = b′.
“⇐”: We prove (4)–(8) simultaneously by induction on the length of computations. For computations of
length zero nothing is to show since the conditions in (B) are void. In the induction step, we again concentrate
on (8); the other cases can be shown analogously. Assume that seen(b) = no and let c /∈ occC(t). For every
t′′ ∈ TC , a ∈ QI , and permitted substitution ′ such that ′ =t , ′(c) = qd , a ∈ [′(t′′)]I, and q(c, t) ∗ t′′ we
need to show that a ∈ S(q,qd )(b). We distinguish two cases depending on whether the ﬁrst transition T applied
in q(c, t) ∗ t′′ is a - or ε-transition.
T is a -transition. Assume that T is a -transition of the form (17) where z = vR. We use c′ ∈ C \ (occC(t) ∪
{c}) as the new constant generated by T (in case T is generative). We have that t = f(t0, . . . , tn−1) for some
ti ∈ TC . Let bi be the uniquely determined element in [(ti)]P = [′(ti)]P. Then, we know that b is b′ where b′ is
deﬁned as in the deﬁnition of transitions. After applying T to q(c, t) we obtain
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t′[c, . . . , c, c′, . . . , c′, q0(c0, tj0), . . . , qr−1(cr−1, tjr−1), ti0 , . . . , til−1 ]
where ci = ∗ if zi = ∗, ci = c if zi = vR, and ci = c′ if zi = vN . Let t′0, . . . , t′r−1 be the terms such that qi(ci , tji ) ∗ t′i
and
t′′ = t′[c, . . . , c, c′, . . . , c′, t′0, . . . , t′r−1, ti0 , . . . , til−1 ].
Since a ∈ [′(t′′)]I, there exist ai ∈ QI such that ai ∈ [′(t′i )]I and
a ∈ [′(t′[c, . . . , c, c′, . . . , c′, a0, . . . , ar−1, [′(ti0)]I, . . . , [′(til−1)]I]]I.
By Lemma 17, (1) and since ′ and  coincide on occC(t), we have Iset(bij ) = [′(tij )]I. Lemma 17, (2) ensures
that qA ∈ LA(b′) = LA(b) = [t]A. We distinguish two cases.
First, assume that ′(c′) = qs, and thus, all other anonymous constants are mapped to qd . It is easy to check
that ′ meets the conditions for D(qi ,si)(bji ) with respect to tji . Thus, the induction hypothesis on the length
of computations yields ai ∈ D(qi ,si)(bji ). Now, it follows that a ∈ [tqd ,qs ]I, and thus, a ∈ S(q,qd )(b′) ⊆ S(q,qd )(b′) =
S(q,qd )(b).
Second, assume that ′ is a permitted substitution such that ′(c′′) = qd for every c′′ ∈ occC(t) ∪ {c, c′}. We
consider two subcases. First, suppose that there exists k and c′′ ∈ occC(t′k) such that ′(c′′) = qs. It follows
that c′′ /∈ occC(t) ∪ {c, c′}, and thus, c′′ was newly generated in qk(ck , tjk ) ∗ t′k . Consequently, c′′ does not oc-
cur in t′i for i = k . It is again easy to check that ′ meets the conditions for D(qi ,si)(bji ) with respect to. tji
for every i = k and S(qk ,sk )(bjk ) with respect to. tjk . Now, the induction hypothesis on the length of com-
putations yields that ai ∈ D(qi ,si)(bji ) for every i = k and ak ∈ S(qk ,sk )(bjk ). Thus, a ∈ [t,kqd ,qs ]I. Consequently,
a ∈ S(q,qd )(b′) ⊆ S(q,qd )(b′) = S(q,qd )(b). If there is no k and c′′ ∈ occC(t′k) such that ′(c′′) = qs, then one can
similarly show that a ∈ [t,k
qd ,qs
]I even for every k , and thus, a ∈ S(q,qd )(b).
T is an ε-transition. This case can be dealt with very similar to the case for -transitions. Instead of using
the deﬁnition of transitions of P one uses the deﬁnition of the ε-closure and the fact that b is ε-closed by
Lemma 16. 
4. The tree transducer-based protocol model
In this section, we introduce our protocol and intruder model. The basic assumptions of our model coincide
with those for decidable models of non-looping protocols: ﬁrst, we analyze protocols with respect to a ﬁnite
number of receive–send actions, and in particular, a ﬁnite number of sessions. Second, the intruder is based
on the Dolev–Yao intruder. He can derive new messages from known messages by decomposition, decryption,
composition, encryption, and hashing. We do not put a bound on the size of messages. As in [2], we assume keys
to be atomic messages; in [34,26,5] they may be complex messages.
The main difference between the model presented here and models for non-looping protocols is the way
receive–send actions are described—instead of single rewrite rules, we use TTAC’s. These transducers have
two important features necessary to model recursive receive–send actions, but missing in decidable models for
non-looping protocols: ﬁrst, they allow to apply a set of rewrite rules recursively to a term. Second, they allow
to generate new constants—a feature not necessary for non-looping protocols when analyzed with respect to a
ﬁnite number of receive–send actions.
We now provide the formal deﬁnition of our tree transducer-based model by deﬁning messages, the intruder,
protocols, and attacks.
4.1. Messages
The deﬁnition of messages we use here is rather standard, except that we allow an inﬁnite number of (anon-
ymous) constants. As mentioned, we assume keys to be atomic.
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More precisely, messages are deﬁned as terms over the signature (A, C) with anonymous constants. The set
C is some countably inﬁnite set of anonymous constants, which in this paper will be used to model session keys
(Section 7.1). The ﬁnite signatureA is deﬁned relatively to a ﬁnite setA of constants, the set of atomic messages,
which may for instance contain principal names and (long-term) keys. It also contains a subset K of public
and private keys which is equipped with a bijective mapping ·−1 assigning to a public (private) key k ∈ K its
corresponding private (public) key k−1 ∈ K. Now, A denotes the (ﬁnite) signature consisting of the constants
from A, the unary symbols hasha (keyed hash) and encsa (symmetric encryption) for every a ∈ A, the unary
symbol encak (asymmetric encryption) for every k ∈ K, and the binary symbol 〈〉 (pairing). Instead of 〈〉(t, t′) we
write 〈t, t′〉. The term hasha(m) shall represent the keyed hash of m under the key a plus m itself. One could
make this explicit by writing 〈m,hash(〈a,m〉)〉 instead of hasha(m). However, checking whether a message is
of the form 〈m,hash(〈a,m〉)〉 for some message m requires the non-linear term 〈x,hash(〈a, x〉)〉, where x is a
variable. To avoid such non-linear terms we use hasha(m), but allow the intruder (see below) to derive m from
hasha(m). The set of messages over (A, C) is denoted by M = TA(C).
Note that anonymous constants are not allowed as keys. It is an open problem whether the decision problem
Attack (see Section 4.4) would still be decidable otherwise.
4.2. The Intruder
As in the case of models for non-looping protocols, our intruder model is based on the Dolev–Yao
intruder [14]. That is, an intruder has complete control over the network and can derive new messages from
his current knowledge by composing, decomposing, encrypting, decrypting, and hashing messages. We do not
impose any restrictions on the size of messages.
The (possibly inﬁnite) set of messages d(S) the intruder can derive from some set S ⊆ M is the smallest set
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) S ⊆ d(S);
(2) if 〈m,m′〉 ∈ d(S), then m,m′ ∈ d(S) (decomposition);
(3) if encsa (m) ∈ d(S) and a ∈ d(S), then m ∈ d(S) (symmetric decryption);
(4) if encak (m) ∈ d(S) and k−1 ∈ d(S), then m ∈ d(S) (asymmetric decryption);
(5) if hasha(m) ∈ d(S), then m ∈ d(S) (obtaining hashed messages);
(6) if m,m′ ∈ d(S), then 〈m,m′〉 ∈ d(S) (composition);
(7) if m ∈ d(S) and a ∈ A ∩ d(S), then encsa (m) ∈ d(S) (symmetric encryption);
(8) if m ∈ d(S) and k ∈ K ∩ d(S), then encak (m) ∈ d(S) (asymmetric encryption);
(9) if m ∈ d(S) and a ∈ A ∩ d(S), then hasha(m) ∈ d(S) (keyed hash).
Let an(S) denote the closure of S under (2)–(5), and syn(S) the closure of S under (6)–(9)
It is well known that d(S) can be obtained by ﬁrst applying an to S and to the result applying syn. This is
because we employ atomic keys; for complex keys this does not hold (see, e.g., [32,28]):
Lemma 18. For every S ⊆ M,
d(S) = syn(an(S)).
We note that although principals have the ability to generate new (anonymous) constants, as they are deﬁned
in terms of TTAC’s, for the intruder adding this ability is not necessary since it would not increase his power to
attack protocols (see also Section 4.4).
4.3. Protocols
Protocols are described by sets of principals and every principal is deﬁned by a sequence of receive–send
actions, which in a protocol run are performed one after the other. Every receive–send action is speciﬁed by a
certain TTAC, which we call message transducer.
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Deﬁnition 19. A message transducer T is a TTAC over (A, C).
Roughly speaking, a principal is deﬁned as a sequence of message transducers.
Deﬁnition 20. A (TTAC-based) principal 
 is a tuple
((T0, . . . ,Tn−1), I)
consisting of a sequence (T0, . . . ,Tn−1) of message transducers and an n-ary relation I ⊆ I0 × · · · × In−1 where
Ii denotes the set of initial states of Ti .
The single message transducers Ti in the deﬁnition of
 are called it receive–send actions. In a protocol run,

performs the receive–send actions one after the other. More precisely, at the beginning of a protocol run, a tuple
(q0, . . . , qn−1) ∈ I is chosen non-deterministically where qi will be the initial state of Ti in the current run. Now,
if in the protocol run the ﬁrst message
 receives is m0, then
 returns some message m′0 with (m0,m
′
0) ∈ T0(q0).
Then, on receiving the secondmessage, saym1,
 returnsm′1 with (m1,m
′
1) ∈ T1(q1), and so on. By ﬁxing the initial
states at the beginning, we model that 
 can convey (a ﬁnite amount of) information from one receive–send
action to another. For example, if q0 encodes that 
 expects to talk to Bob, then q1 might describe that in the
second message 
 expects to see Bob’s name again.
A protocol is deﬁned to be a ﬁnite family of principals plus—since we are interested in attacks on proto-
cols—an initial intruder knowledge and information about which receive–send actions are to be thought of as
being “challenge” actions:
Deﬁnition 21. A (TTAC-based) protocol P is a tuple ({
i}i<n,S ,C) where
–{
i}i<n is a family of n (TTAC-based) principals, and
–S ⊆ M is a ﬁnite set, the initial intruder knowledge,
–C ⊆ {0, . . . , n− 1} is the set of challenge indices.
The last action of principal i will be called a challenge output action if i ∈ C . (The use of challenge output actions
will be explained in the next section.)
The class of protocols that can be speciﬁed according to Deﬁnition 21 can roughly be characterized as fol-
lows: in every receive–send action, principals can perform recursive computations, which, since described as
TTAC, allow to recursively carry out linear checks on input messages (i.e., checks that can be expressed in terms
of matching against linear terms). For example, in one receive–send action a principal can go through a list
of requests and check the format of every request by matching against a linear term. In the recursive process
principals can also produce an unbounded number of fresh nonces (anonymous constants) and build complex
output messages, e.g., a list of certiﬁcates containing sessions keys (freshly generated anonymous constants) or a
message containing deeply nested encryptions. Furthermore, as explained above, principals can convey a ﬁnite
amount of information from one receive–send action to the next. In Section 7, we illustrate the kind of protocols
that can be modeled by examples.
4.4. Attacks
In an attack on a protocol, the intruder, who has complete control over the communication network, inter-
leaves the receive–send actions of the principals in someway (i.e., determines a total ordering on the receive–send
actions), and tries to produce inputs for the principals such that from the corresponding outputs and his initial
knowledge he can derive some secret, i.e., some message not supposed to fall into the hands of the intruder.
Such a secret can for example be a session key or some secret message. Thus, one can check whether a protocol
preserves secrecy. One can also check some weak kind of authentication. For example, the secret may be some
auxiliary message indicating that a principal, say P , completed a session with an instance of another principal,
say P ′, which does not exist in the speciﬁed protocol model. Now, if the intruder gets to see the secret message,
this means that the authentication property is violated. Stronger forms of authentication could also be checked
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if the absence of certain receive–send actions would be tested. However, authentication is not the main focus of
the present work and we therefore will not further investigate authentication here.
In the deﬁnition of attacks we make use of challenge output actions (see Deﬁnition 21). In the interleaving
of receive–send actions determined by the intruder, we require that the last receive–send action (and only this
action) is a challenge output action. This action determines the secret the intruder tries to derive. That is, the
output of this action is not added to the intruder’s knowledge but it is presented to him as a challenge, i.e., a
message to be derived.
The use of challenge output actions allows to determine secrets dynamically, depending on the protocol run.
This is for example needed when asking whether the intruder is able to derive a session key (an anonymous con-
stant, which may change from one protocol run to another) generated by a key distribution server. Alternatively
and equivalently (to dispense with challenge output actions), one could ask whether the intruder can derive an
a priori ﬁxed atomic message, say secret, which is encrypted by an anonymous constant (the session key): the
encrypted secret can be derived by the intruder iff the intruder knows the anonymous constant used to encrypt
secret. However, since in general we do not allow anonymous constants as keys (see Sections 4.1 and 8), we ﬁnd
the use of challenge output actions more elegant than introducing special kinds of messages with anonymous
constants as keys. Moreover, challenge output actions are somewhat related to the way security is deﬁned in
computational models for key distribution protocols where at the end of an attack, the intruder is presented a
string for which he needs to decide whether it is an actual session key or just some random string [4].
We remark that the way attacks are deﬁned here allows to ask whether the intruder can derive a message
that belongs to some pre-deﬁned regular tree language. In most models for non-looping protocols this is not
possible (see, however, [37,18,27]).
Deﬁnition 22. Let P = ({
i}i<n,S ,C) be a protocol with
i = ((Ti0, . . . , T
i
ni−1), Ii) and Ii ⊆ I i0 × · · · × I ini−1 for
i < n.
An attack on P is a tuple
(O,<, )
consisting of
– a non-empty set O ⊆ {(i, j) | i < n, j < ni} of indices of receive–send actions triggered during an attack,
– a total ordering < on O, the interleaving of the receive–send actions, and
– a mapping  assigning to every (i, j) ∈ O a tuple  (i, j) = (qij ,mij ,m′ij)
and satisfying the following conditions:
(1) For every (i, j) ∈ O, if (i, j) ∈ O, then (i, j′) ∈ O and (i, j′) < (i, j) for every j′ < j.
(2)Let (i, j) be the greatest element ofO with respect to<. Then, for each (i′, j′) ∈ O, the action Ti
′
j′ is a challenge
output action iff (i, j) = (i′, j′).
(3) Let i < n and j maximal with (i, j) ∈ O. Then there exist qij+1, . . . , qini−1 such that (qi0, . . . , qini−1) ∈ Ii ,
(4) For each (i, j) ∈ O it holds that mij ,m′ij ∈ M and (mij ,m′ij) ∈ Tij(qij).
(5) For each (i, j) ∈ O it holds that (occC(m′ij) \ occC(mij)) ∩ occC(Sij) = ∅ where Sij = S ∪ {m′i
′
j′ | (i′, j′) < (i, j)}.
(6) For every (i, j) ∈ O it holds that mij ∈ d(Sij).
An attack is called successful if the last receive–send action, the challenge output action, say with index (i, j) ∈ O,
returns some c such that c ∈ d(Sij) ∩ (A ∪ C).
Note that (5) ensures that new anonymous constants generated in one receive–send action are also new with
respect to the knowledge of the intruder before this action is performed. Note also that in (6) the set d(Sij) is the
intruder knowledge before performing the receive–send action in step (i, j).
The decision problem we are interested in is:
Attack. Given a protocol P , decide whether there exists a successful attack on P .
If there is no successful attack on a protocol, we say that the protocol is secure.
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As mentioned above, extending the intruder by allowing him to generate new constants does not increase his
ability to attack protocols. The following remark makes this more precise.
Remark 23. If the initial intruder knowledge contains at least one anonymous constant, then there exists an
attack on a protocol P iff there exists an attack on P in which the intruder may generate new anonymous
constants.
Proof. Formally, an intruder which may generate anonymous constants is an intruder whose initial knowledge
contains an inﬁnite number of anonymous constants (in addition to his ordinary initial knowledge). We argue
that one anonymous constant, say cI , is enough.
The reason is that TTAC’s cannot check anonymous constants for disequality. If (m,m′) belongs to the
transduction of a TTAC, then so does ((m), (m′)) where  maps anonymous constants in m to some arbitrary
constant c′ /∈ occC(m′) \ occC(m), i. e., some constant not newly generated. This means, in particular, if (mij ,m′ij)
is part of an attack, then so is ((mij), (m
′i
j)) where  maps anonymous constants from the initial intruder
knowledge in mij to cI . Observe that if m
i
j can be derived by the intruder, then so can (m
i
j). 
Since in models for non-looping protocols disequality tests between messages are usually not possible as well
(an exception is [15]), in these models extending the intruder with the ability to generate new constants would
also not increase his power to attack protocols.
5. The decidability result
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 24. For TTAC-based protocols, Attack is decidable.
To prove this theorem it obviously sufﬁces to show that the following problem is decidable.
InterleavingAttack. Given a ﬁnite set S ⊆ M (the initial intruder knowledge), a sequence T0, . . . ,Tl−1 of mes-
sage transducers (the interleaving of receive–send actions) with Ti = (Qi , Ii ,Ai , i) for i < l, decide whether there
exist messages mi ,m′i ∈ M, i < l, such that
(1) (mi ,m′i) ∈ Ti for every i < l,
(2) (occC(m′i) \ occC(mi)) ∩ occC(Si) = ∅ for every i < l,
(3) mi ∈ d(Si) for every i < l, and
(4) m′l−1 ∈ d(Sl−1) ∩ (A ∪ C),
where Si = S ∪ {m′0, . . . ,m′i−1} is the intruder’s knowledge before the ith receive–send action is performed.
We write (S ,T0, . . . ,Tl−1) ∈ InterleavingAttack if all the above conditions are satisﬁed.
The proof of the decidability of InterleavingAttack proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the intruder
can be simulated by a TTAC (see Section 5.1). Then, we reduce the problem InterleavingAttack to the problem
IteratedPreImage (Section 5.2), which we know is decidable.
5.1. Derive is TTAC realizable
Wewish to show that themessages in d({m}) for somemessagem can be produced by aTTAC.More precisely,
we will construct a TTAC Tder such that Tder (m) = d({m}) for every message m.
We ﬁrst deﬁne what we call the key discovery automaton which is used as look-ahead in Tder .
5.1.1. Key discovery
The key discovery automaton D is a complete and deterministic WTAAC containing all information about
which keys can be accessed in a given message. More precisely, a state of the key discovery automaton is a func-
tion 2A → 2A and the automaton is set up in a way such that the state [m]D the automaton is in after reading the
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messagem—note that since D is complete and deterministic, [m]D = {ϕ} for some function ϕ—has the following
property: [m]D(K) is the set of atoms that may be derived from K and m, i.e., [m]D(K) = an({m} ∪ K) ∩A for
every K ⊆ A and message m. In the following, it is argued that this is indeed possible, that is, we will construct
D with the desired property. The set of all functions 2A → 2A, that is, the state set of D, is denotedQD. We note
that the cardinality of QD is double exponential in the cardinality of A.
The default state of D is the identity mapping. The transitions of D are deﬁned as follows. For every a ∈ A,
D contains a transition
a → (K → K ∪ {a})
for every K ⊆ A.
For every a ∈ A, k ∈ K, and d ′ ∈ QD, the WTAAC D contains transitions
encsa (d
′) → d ,
encak (d
′) → d ,
hasha(d
′) → d ,
where d is determined by the following table:
left-hand side condition on K d(K)
encsa (d
′) a ∈ K d ′(K)
encsa (d
′) a /∈ K K
encak (d
′) k−1 ∈ K d ′(K)
encak (d
′) k−1 /∈ K K
hasha(d ′) no condition K .
Finally, for every d ′, d ′′ ∈ QD, the WTAAC D contains a transition
〈d ′, d ′′〉 → d (19)
where, for every K ⊆ A, d(K) is the smallest set such that
– K ⊆ d(K),
– if K ′ ⊆ d(K), then d ′(K ′) ⊆ d(K),
– if K ′ ⊆ d(K), then d ′′(K ′) ⊆ d(K).
The deﬁnition of (19) is more involved than the deﬁnition of the other transitions since in a message of the form
〈m,m′〉 keys in m could be used to obtain new keys in m′ (and vice versa) and these keys can in turn be used to
obtain new keys in m, which can in turn be used to obtain new keys in m′, and so on. Therefore d(K) is deﬁned
by a least ﬁxed point.
The correctness of the construction is asserted in the following lemma:
Lemma 25. For every message m ∈ M and K ⊆ A we have that
[m]D(K) = an({m} ∪ K) ∩A.
Proof.The proof is straightforward and can be carried out by induction on the structure ofm, using the deﬁnition
of an(·). 
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5.1.2. The Transducer Tder
The TTAC Tder is based on a simple idea, which is motivated by Lemma 18. To describe it, we need some
more notation. For a set K ⊆ A, let (K) be the signature deﬁned by
(K) = {encsa,hasha | a ∈ K} ∪ {encak | k ∈ K ∩K}.
Using this notation, Lemma 18 implies:
Lemma 26. Let m,m′ ∈ M. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(A) m′ ∈ d({m}).
(B) m′ is of the form t[m0, . . .,mn−1] where the mi are obtained by successive decryptions and splittings from m, and
the keys in t are also obtainable by successive decryptions and splittings from m, i.e., there exists a linear term
t(x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ T(an({m})∩A)(X) such that m′ = t[m0, . . . ,mn−1] where mi ∈ an({m}) for every i < n.
TheTTACTder has a distinguished initial state qI and, for eachK ⊆ A, there are two states (qS ,K) and (qA,K),
the indices being reminiscent of “syn” and “an”. The transducer works in three phases on a given message m.
The ﬁrst phase is just one step and simply determines the set K of keys that can be discovered from the given
messagem, that is, it determines K = an{m} ∩A. In the second phase, the term t from above is generated, that is,
non-deterministically a message mS is constructed which can be written as t[m,m,m, . . . ,m] where t(x0, . . . , xr−1)
is a linear term from T(an({m})∩A)(X). In the third phase, every copy ofm in t[m, . . . ,m] is (non-deterministically)
replaced by some message from an({m}). The above lemma guarantees that Tder exactly computes the messages
derivable from m.
To bemore precise, we have the following transitions inTder . Since forTder no register is used, in what follows
we write s(t) instead of s(∗, t) where s is a state of Tder , i.e., s = qI , s = (qS ,K), or s = (qA,K) for some K ⊆ A.
For the ﬁrst phase, for every d ∈ QD, Tder contains the transition
qI (x) →d (qS , d(∅))(x)
For the second phase, for every K ⊆ A, Tder contains the following transitions:
(qS ,K)(x) → 〈(qS ,K)(x), (qS ,K)(x)〉
(qS ,K)(x) → encsa ((qS ,K)(x)) for a ∈ K
(qS ,K)(x) → encak ((qS ,K)(x)) for k ∈ K ∩K
(qS ,K)(x) → hasha((qS ,K)(x)) for a ∈ K
(qS ,K)(x) → (qA,K)(x)
For the third phase, for every K ⊆ A, Tder contains the following transitions:
(qA,K)(x) → x
(qA,K)(x) → a for a ∈ K
(qA,K)(〈x0, x1〉) → (qA,K)(x0)
(qA,K)(〈x0, x1〉) → (qA,K)(x1)
(qA,K)(encsa (x)) → (qA,K)(x) for a ∈ K
(qA,K)(encak (x)) → (qA,K)(x) for k−1 ∈ K ∩K
(qA,K)(hasha(x)) → (qA,K)(x) for a ∈ A
Writing der instead of Tder , we can state:
Lemma 27. der(m) = d({m}) for every m ∈ M.
Proof. From the construction of Tder , it is easy to see that ifm is a message with K = an({m}) ∩A andm′ is such
that qI (m) ∗ m′, then
qI (m)  (qS ,K)(m) ∗ t[(qS ,K)(m), . . . , (qS ,K)(m)]
∗ t[(qA,K)(m), . . . , (qA,K)(m)] ∗ t(m0, . . . ,mn−1) = m′ (20)
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where t ∈ T(an({m})∩A)(X) and mi ∈ an({m}) for every i < n. This shows that der(m) ⊆ d({m}).
Similarly, it is easy to see that for every choice of t andm as above, one has (20) with K = an({m}) ∩A, which
implies d({m}) ⊆ der(m). 
Note that even if we allowed the intruder to generate anonymous constants, we could model such an intruder
by a TTAC since TTAC’s can generate anonymous constants. More precisely, one could simulate the intruder
by a composition of two TTAC’s: the ﬁrst TTAC copies the input into the output and adds an arbitrary number
of new anonymous constants to the output. This can be achieved by using ε-transitions. The second transducers
works just as the transducer described above. Note that this transducer obtains the original message together
with the constants generated by the ﬁrst transducer as input. However, as stated in Remark 23, since the intruder
is not more powerful if he can generate anonymous constants, it sufﬁces to model the simpler intruder.
5.2. Reduction to the iterated pre-image word problem
We now reduce InterleavingAttack to IteratedPreImage by formulating an attack as a composition of
transducers.Weﬁrst need to introduce two variants ofTder andone variant ofTi , mainly to pass on the intruder’s
knowledge from one transducer to the next.
The ﬁrst variant of Tder , called T
copy
der , copies its input to the ﬁrst component of a pair and simulates Tder on
the second component, i.e.,
Tcopyder
= {(m, 〈m,m′〉) | m′ ∈ d({m})}.
The TTAC T copyder can be derived from Tder in a straightforward way. We equip Tder with an additional state,
say qcopyI , and declare it to be the initial state of T
copy
der . In addition, we add the following transition:
q
copy
I (∗, x) → 〈x, qI (∗, x)〉.
Recall that qI is the initial state of Tder . For ease in notation, let 
copy
der = Tcopyder .
The second variant, called T challder , expects an input of the form 〈m,m′〉, copies the second component into
the output and simulates Tder on the ﬁrst component. We call this transducer the challenge transducer since it
receives in the second component the challenge and tries to derive it from the ﬁrst component, the intruder’s
knowledge. Again, this variant of Tder can easily be obtained from Tder . We add onemore state, say q
chall
I , which
is the initial state of T challder , and we also add the following transition:
qchallI (∗, 〈x0, x1〉) → 〈qI (∗, x0), x1〉.
Let challder = T challder .
Finally, we introduce a variant Tˆi of Ti to (i) pass on the intruder’s knowledge and (ii) to satisfy condition
(2) in the deﬁnition of InterleavingAttack, i.e., anonymous constants generated in a receive–send action are
different from the anonymous constants generated so far. To this end, Tˆi only accepts pairs as input, copies
the ﬁrst component into the output (this component stands for the intruder’s knowledge) and simulates Ti on
the second component (this component corresponds to the input for Ti). Obviously, Tˆi deﬁned in this way
accomplishes (i). But it also achieves (ii) since by our deﬁnition of the computations of a TTAC, anonymous
constants generated by a transducer are different from those that occur in the input. It is again straightforward
to obtain Tˆi from Ti: We add one state q to the set of states of Ti and declare it to be the (only) initial state of
Tˆi , and for every initial state qI of Ti , we add the transition
q(∗, 〈x0, x1〉) → 〈x0, qI (∗, x1)〉.
Let ˆi = Tˆi .
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We also need the tree language
R = {〈a, a〉 | a ∈ A} ∪ {〈c, c〉 | c ∈ C}
which, using Example 1, can easily be seen to be TAAC recognizable. For a ﬁnite set S = {u0, . . . , un−1} of
messages let mS be the message deﬁned by
mS = 〈u0, 〈u1, 〈· · · 〈un−2, un−1〉 · · ·〉〉〉
(the order of the ui ′s does not matter); this makes sure that we have d(S) = d(mS). Finally, let
 = challder ◦ ˆl−1 ◦ copyder ◦ ˆl−2 ◦ copyder ◦ · · · ◦ copyder ◦ ˆ0 ◦ copyder .
Then, by construction, we obtain the following characterization for the problem InterleavingAttack.
Lemma 28. For every S and T0, . . . ,Tl−1 as in the deﬁnition of the problem InterleavingAttack, we have
(S ,T0, . . . ,Tl−1) ∈ InterleavingAttackiffmS ∈ −1(R).
Together with Corollary 12 this immediately implies:
Theorem 29. InterleavingAttack is decidable.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 24.
By reduction from the intersection problem for top-down tree automata—given a sequence of top-down tree
automata A1, . . . ,An, decide whether the intersection L(A1) ∩ · · · ∩ L(An) is empty—, which is known to be EXP-
TIME-complete [35], it is easy to see that the problems Attack and InterleavingAttack are EXPTIME-hard
since TTACs can simulate such tree automata and by composing TTACs one can simulate the intersection of
such automata. Since our decision procedure for the iterated pre-image word problem is non-elementary, this
is also the case for the problems Attack and InterleavingAttack. Hence, it remains to ﬁnd a tight complexity
bound for these problems.
6. Extensions of the model and undecidability results
As mentioned in Section 4, the basic assumptions of our tree transducer-based protocol model and models
for non-looping protocols coincide (ﬁnite number of receive–send actions, Dolev–Yao intruder without a bound
on the size of messages). In fact, in the TTAC-based protocol model as introduced in Section 4, many non-loop-
ing protocols can be analyzed with the same precision as in decidable models for non-looping protocols with
atomic keys (see, e.g., [2]). More precisely, this is the case for protocols where (a) the receive–send actions can
be described by rewrite rules with linear left-hand side, since TTAC’s can simulate all such rewrite rules, and
(b) only a ﬁnite amount of information needs to be conveyed from one receive–send action to the next. This
includes for instance many of the protocols in the Clark-Jacobs library [11]. (To illustrate this, in Section 7.2 we
provide a formal TTAC-based model of the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol.)
However, some features present in decidable models for non-looping protocols are missing in the TTAC-
based protocol model:
(1) equality tests for messages of arbitrary size, which are possible when
(a) left-hand sides of rewrite rules may be non-linear (this corresponds to allowing non-linear left-hand sides
in transitions of TTAC) or
(b) arbitrary messages can be conveyed from one receive–send action to another and can then be compared
with other messages [2,34,26,5];
(2) complex keys, i.e., keys that may be arbitrary messages [34,26,5]; and
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(3) relaxing the free term algebra assumption by adding the XOR operator [8,13] or Difﬁe-Hellman exponenti-
ation [9].
The main result of this section is that these features cannot be added without losing decidability.
Our undecidability results show that if one equality test can be performed then Attack is undecidable. While
in (1) the equality test is explicitly present, in (2) and (3) implicit equality tests are possible. In the following
subsections, the undecidability results are presented in detail.
We remark that when an intruder is allowed to use an unbounded number of copies of a principal to perform
an attack, i.e., the protocol is analyzed with respect to an unbounded number of sessions—and thus, receive–
send actions—, then Attack is undecidable as well. This is not surprising, since the same is true for models of
non-looping protocols (see, e.g., [2]).
6.1. Encoding Post’s Correspondence Problem
We start with an undecidability result which is purely automata-theoretic. It will then be used over and
over again to obtain the protocol-related undecidability results. More precisely, we show how to model Post’s
Correspondence Problem (PCP) by composing transducers.
Recall that an instance of PCP is composed of two sequences 	 = 	1, . . . , 	n and  = 1, . . . ,n of words over
a two-letter alphabet . The problem is to determine whether there exists a sequence u = i0, . . . , ik of indices
such that 	i0 . . . 	ik = i0 . . . ik . Such a sequence of indices is called a feasible solution; any sequence is just
called a solution. The two words are denoted 	(u) and (u), respectively.
Wewill encode aword	 = a0 . . . al−1 ∈ ∗ with ai ∈ by the term 〈a0, 〈a1, . . . , 〈al−1,⊥〉 · · ·〉, whichwe denote
[	]. Here, ⊥ is a new constant. We will also encode indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. To this end, let b be a new constant and
let bi denote the word b · · · b of length i. Then, i is encoded by [bi], which, for convenience, is also denoted [i]. If
u = i0i1 . . . il is a solution, we write [u] for 〈[i0], 〈[i1], . . . , 〈[il],⊥〉 . . .〉〉.
In addition to b, we will use the new constants b1, b2, and secret. Thus the set of atomic messages is deﬁned
to be A =  ∪ {b, b1, b2,⊥, secret}.
We next describe transducers T0, T1, and T2 such that an instance of the PCP as above has a feasible solution
if and only if in T2(T1(T0(b))) there exists a term 〈t, t〉.
Transducer T0 generates the encoding of any solution and therefore has the following transitions:
qI (b) → 〈[i], q(b)〉 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
q(b) → 〈[i], q(b)〉 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
q(b) → ⊥.
Transducer T1 consists of one transition only and doubles every term:
qI (〈x0, x1〉) → 〈〈x0, x1〉, 〈x0, x1〉〉.
In the above transition we write 〈x0, x1〉 instead of x to make sure that the list of indices received from T0 is not
empty.
Transducer T2 takes any pair of encoded solutions and replaces the lists by the concatenation of the corre-
spondingwords (encodedasdescribedabove). There is one transitionwhich starts the substitution/concatenation
process in each component:
qI (〈x, x′〉) → 〈q	(x), q(x′)〉.
In addition, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with 	i = a0 · · · al−1 and i = b0 · · · bm−1, there are transitions for the substi-
tution/concatenation process:
q	(〈[i], x〉) → 〈a0, 〈a1, . . . , 〈al−1, q	(x)〉 · · ·〉,
q(〈[i], x〉) → 〈b0, 〈b1, . . . , 〈bm−1, q(x)〉 · · ·〉.
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Finally, there are two transitions to stop the substitution/concatenation process:
q	(⊥) → ⊥,
q(⊥) → ⊥.
Now, the following lemma is easy to see:
Lemma 30. For a given instance of the PCP, let T0,T1,T2 be the transducers deﬁned above. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(A) The instance has a feasible solution.
(B) There exists a term t such that 〈t, t〉 ∈ T2(T1(T0(b))).
Before we apply this in the cryptographic setting, we use it for an automata-theoretic problem.
Wedeﬁne the following extensionofTTAC’s.A top-down tree transducerwith non-linear left-hand side (TTNL)
is a TTAC with transitions of the form as deﬁned in (3) but where t is not required to be linear.
Now we can prove:
Theorem 31. For TTNL’s, the iterated pre-image problem is undecidable.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the PCP. Given a PCP instance as above, we construct T0, T1, and T2 as
above. In addition, we construct the TTNL T3 deﬁned by the single transition
qI (〈x, x〉) → secret.
Clearly, T3(t) /= ∅ only if t = 〈t0, t1〉 where t0 = t1, and if this is the case, then T3(t) = {secret}. From this and
Lemma 30, we obtain that the instance has a feasible solution if and only if secret ∈ (T3 ◦ T2 ◦ T1 ◦ T0)−1({b}),
which completes the description of the desired reduction. 
We note that for this undecidability result to hold allowing ε-transitions in transducers is essential: if ε-tran-
sitions are not allowed, then on a given input, a transducer can only produce a ﬁnite number of outputs modulo
new anonymous constants. In addition, it is easy to bound the number of anonymous constants to be considered.
Thus, we obtain:
Observation 32. For TTNLs without ε-transitions, i.e., only with -transitions of the form (17), the iterated
pre-image word problem is decidable.
6.2. Equality tests on messages
We start with the following deﬁnition. A protocol where the receive–send actions are deﬁned by TTNL’s is
called a TTNL-based protocol.
We show the following:
Theorem 33. For TTNL-based protocols, Attack and InterleavingAttack are undecidable.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the PCP. We demonstrate the proof for InterleavingAttack; the one
for Attack is essentially the same.
The reduction is essentially the same as the one in the proof of Theorem 31, but we cannot simply take the four
transducers as the protocol description, because the intruder could interfere, and we have to produce a challenge
output action. To prevent the intruder from interfering, we simply encrypt the output of every transducer with
a key not known to the intruder and make sure that only encrypted messages are accepted. In addition, we
use a different key for every transducer. This makes sure that the order in which the transducers are applied is
preserved.
More precisely, we modify the transducers as follows:
− T0: We add the transition q∗I (x) → encsb0(qI (x)) to T0 and declare q∗I to be the initial state.
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− T1: We add the transition q∗I (encsb0(x)) → encsb1(qI (x)) and declare q∗I to be the initial state.
− T2: We add the transition q∗I (encsb1(x)) → encsb2(qI (x)) and declare q∗I to be the initial state.
− T3: We add the transition q∗I (encsb2(x)) → qI (x) and declare q∗I to be the initial state.
In addition, we add the transducer T4 deﬁned by qI (b) → secret. Now, it is clear that the instance of
InterleavingAttack determined by the transducers T0, . . ., T4 and the initial knowledge S = {b} is solvable
iff the given instance of the PCP has a feasible solution. 
6.3. Complex keys and challenge outputs
To model complex keys, we replace the unary symbol encsa (·) by the binary symbol enc(·, ·). The message
enc(m,m′) with m,m′ ∈ M stands for the message m′ encrypted by m. Note that the key m may be a complex
message.
Accordingly, we extend the intruder’s ability to derive messages. If the intruder knows m,m′ ∈ M, then he
can generate enc(m,m′). If he knows enc(m,m′) and m, then he knows m′ as well.
The transducers used to deﬁne principals are not extended, except that the signature changes.
We have:
Theorem 34. For TTAC-based protocols with complex keys, Attack and InterleavingAttack are undecidable.
Proof. To see this it sufﬁces to observe that in the reduction from the proof of Theorem 33, T3 can be replaced
by the transducer deﬁned by
q∗I (encsb2(〈x, x′〉) → 〈encsencsb3 (x)
(secret),encsb3(x
′)〉,
where b3 is a new constant not known by the intruder. This ensures that the intruder can get hold of secret iff
the messages substituted for x and x′ coincide. In other words, the reduction uses that decryption for complex
keys requires equality tests for messages of arbitrary size. 
Similarly, we obtain an undecidability result if we allow arbitrary challenge output actions. More precisely,
the setting is as follows. The message space is deﬁned as in Section 4, but in a challenge output action the
principal is allowed to return any message from M as challenge (rather than an element of C ∪A).
Theorem 35. For TTAC-based protocols with arbitrary challenge output messages, Attack and
InterleavingAttack are undecidable.
Proof. We modify the reduction from the proof of Theorem 33 appropriately. First, we deﬁne the transducer
T3 by the transition
qI
(
encsb2(〈x, x′〉)
)
→ 〈encsb3(x),encsb4(x′)〉
and T4 by
qI
(
encsb4(x)
)
→ encsb3(x),
where b3 and b4 are new constants not known to the intruder. Thus, the challenge for the intruder is encsb3(x
′)
which he can derive only if the messages substituted for x and x′ in the transition of T2 coincide. 
6.4. XOR and Difﬁe-Hellman exponentiation
Wenext prove that extending the protocolmodel by exclusive or (XOR) or byDifﬁe-Hellman exponentiation
leads to undecidability. We ﬁrst consider XOR.
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The message space is extended as follows. We add the constant 0 and the binary symbol ⊕ which among oth-
ers has the following algebraic property: m⊕ m = 0 (see, e.g., [8] for other properties of XOR.) These properties
induce an equivalence relation ≡ on messages. For instance, encsa (m⊕ m) ≡ encsa (0). Note that this gives a
way to compare messages for equality.
In general, one would extend the intruder by the ability to combine messages using the XOR operator. For
the undecidability result it does, however, not make a difference whether or not the intruder is equipped with
this ability.
Also, one would require the transducers to work on equivalence classes of messages according to the XOR
theory. However, it is easy to see that for the reduction this also does not matter.
Theorem 36. For TTAC-protocols with XOR, the problem Attack and the problem InterleavingAttack are
undecidable.
Proof. To show undecidability, we can again modify the reduction from PCP as described in the proof of The-
orem 33. Instead of just T3 we now need two transducers, T3 and T4. Transducer T4 in the proof of Theorem
33 is now called T5.
The transducer T3 is now given by
qI
(
encsb2(〈x, x′〉)
)
→ encsb3
(
x ⊕ x′) .
Thus, the intruder obtains encsb3(0) iff the messages substituted for x and x
′ coincide.
Now, T4 checks whether the intruder knows enc
s
b3
(0) and if so returns secret. That is, T4 is deﬁned by
qI
(
encsb3(0)
)
→ secret.
Transducer T5 is deﬁned just as T4 in the proof of Theorem 33. 
A similar reduction is possible for Difﬁe-Hellman exponentiation [9] since the normalization also involves
comparison of arbitrary messages, for instance, Exp(g, x · x′−1) = 1 iff x = x′. We obtain:
Theorem 37. For TTAC-based protocols with Difﬁe-Hellman exponentiation, Attack and InterleavingAttack
are undecidable.
7. Modeling cryptographic protocols
In this section, we present formal TTAC-based protocols models for the recursive authentication protocol
(as an example of a recursive protocol) and the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol (as an example of a
non-looping protocol).
7.1. The recursive authentication protocol
In Section 7.1.1, we ﬁrst give an informal description of the recursive authentication protocol (RA protocol).
Section 7.1.2 provides a formal TTAC-based model for this protocol. In what follows, we abbreviate messages
of the form 〈m0, . . . , 〈mn−1,mn〉 · · ·〉 by m0 · · ·mn or m0, . . . ,mn.
7.1.1. Informal description of the RA protocol
The RA protocol was proposed by [7] and it extends the authentication protocol by [31] in that it allows to
establish session keys between an a priori unbounded number of principals in one protocol run. Our description
of the RA protocol follows [32].
In the RA protocol one assumes that a key distribution server S shares long-term keys with the principals. In
Figure 1 a typical protocol run is depicted. In this run, A wants to establish a session key with B and B wants to
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Fig. 1. A run of the recursive authentication protocol.
establish a session key withC . The number of principals involved in a protocol run is not bounded. In particular,
C could send a message to some principal D in order to establish a session key with D and D could continue
and send a message to E, and so on. In the protocol run depicted in Figure 1, we assume that C does not want
to talk to another principal and therefore sends a message to the key distribution server S , who is involved in
every protocol run.
In Fig. 1,Ka (resp.Kb,Kc) denotes the long-term key shared between A and S (resp. B and S ,C and S). WithNa,
Nb, and Nc we denote nonces (i.e., random numbers) generated by A, B, and C , respectively. Finally, Kab, Kbc, and
Kcs are the session keys generated by the server and used by the principals for secure communication between
A and B, B and C , and C and S , respectively. The numbers ((1)–(6)) attached to the messages only indicate the
order in which the messages are sent and do not belong to the protocol.
We now take a closer look at the messages exchanged between the principals in the order they are sent: In the
ﬁrst messages (1), principal A indicates that she requests a session key from the server for secure communication
with B. The symbol “−” says that this message started the protocol run. Now, in the second message (2), B
sends something similar to C but with A’s message instead of “−”, indicating that he wants to share a session
key with C . As mentioned, this step could be repeated as many times as desired, yielding an ever-growing stack
of requests. The process is terminated if one principal contacts S . In our example, we assume that C does not
request another session key, and therefore, sends the message received from B to S (3). This message is now
processed by S . This can be done in different ways. In what follows, we describe one possible way.
First, S checks whether the outer request is in fact addressed to S . If so, S generates a new session key and
stores it. Now, S processes the requests starting from the outermost. In general, S has a “frame” containing two
requests at a time. In the example, S starts with a frame containing the requests CSNc and BCNb. Thus, S knows
that C wants to talk to S and that Bwants to talk to C . Consequently, S has to generate two so-called certiﬁcates
for C , one that contains the session key for communication with S and the other one for communication with
B. These certiﬁcates are generated by S as follows. The ﬁrst one contains the session key stored, the name S of
the server, and C’s nonce Nc. For the second certiﬁcate, S generates a new session key, stores it for later use, and
then assembles the second certiﬁcate for C containing the session key just generated, B’s name, and C’s nonce
Nc. At this point, all certiﬁcates for C have been prepared. Therefore, S moves the frame one request further
and processes this frame as before. Note that now the frame contains the requests BCNb and ABNa, and that for
the ﬁrst certiﬁcate sent to B, S uses the session key stored. After the two certiﬁcates for B have been prepared,
S moves the frame one request further. Now this frame contains only one request, namely, ABNa−. The marker
“−” indicates thatA started the protocol. Therefore, only one certiﬁcate forA is generated. It contains the session
key stored, B’s name, and A’s nonce Na. After this, S has prepared all certiﬁcates and sends them back to the
principal who called S . In the example this is C .
PrincipalC accepts the ﬁrst two certiﬁcates, extracts the two session keys, and forwards the rest of themessage
to his predecessor in the chain (5). Then,B does the same, and forwards the last certiﬁcate toA (6) Since according
to the intruder model, the message send by S is sent to the intruder, we may assume that every principal only
receives his or her certiﬁcates and does not need to forward the rest of the message to his or her predecessor.
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7.1.2. The TTAC-based protocol model
Wenowprovide a formal description of theRAprotocol in the TTAC-based protocolmodel. Inwhat follows,
let P0, . . . , Pn be the principals participating in the RA protocol. We assume that Pn = S is the server. Every Pi ,
i < n, shares a long-term key Ki with S . We model static corruption and therefore partition the set of principals
into honest H and dishonest D principals, i.e., we have H ∪D = {0, . . . , n} and H ∩D = ∅. We assume that S
is honest, and hence, S ∈ H. The intruder will play the role of the dishonest principals and for this purpose his
initial knowledge will contain Ki for every i ∈ D.
In the following, we ﬁrst specify honest agents and the server. We then put everything together to formally
specify the RA protocol as a TTAC-based protocol.
Modeling the honest agents. An honest agent Pi , i < n and i ∈ H, performs two receive–send actions and is given
by the tuple
i =
(
T
i
0 ,T
i
1 , I i
)
. The different components are deﬁned next. The nonce sent by Pi in the request
message is denoted by the constant Ni .
The message transducer T
i
0 for sending the request message consists of two transitions. The ﬁrst one is
(request,⊥, Pj′)(∗, init) → hashKi (Pi , Pj′ ,Ni ,−),
and the second one is
(request, Pj , Pj′)(∗,hasha(Pj , Pi , x0, x1)) → hashKi (Pi , Pj′ ,Ni ,hasha(Pj , Pi , x0, x1)),
where x0 and x1 are variables, j′  n, j < n, a ∈ A, and init ∈ A is some atomic message known to the intruder.
The ﬁrst transition is applied if Pi initiates a protocol run and calls Pj′ . The second transition is applied if Pi is
called by Pj and sends a message to Pj′ . The initial states of T
i
0 are (request,⊥, Pj′) and (request, Pj , Pj′) for
every j′  n and j < n.
The transducer T
i
1 is a challenge output action which receives a session key and sends it out to the intruder
as a challenge in case the communication partner is honest. Note that the secrecy of a session key only needs to
be guaranteed among honest principals. If one communication partner is dishonest it is clear that the intruder
can derive the session key by simply following the protocol. Hence, in this case the challenge could always bemet
by the intruder. For every j1, j2, j3  n and j4, j5 < n with j1, j3, j4 ∈ H, Ti1 contains the following transitions:
(key,⊥, Pj1)(∗,encsKi (x0, Pj1 ,Ni)) → x0
(key, Pj2 , Pj3)(∗, 〈encsKi (x0, Pj3 ,Ni),encsKi (x1, Pj2 ,Ni)〉) → x0
(key, Pj4 , Pj5)(∗, 〈encsKi (x0, Pj5 ,Ni),encsKi (x1, Pj4 ,Ni)〉) → x1
where x0 and x1 are variables. The ﬁrst transition is applied if Pi initiated the protocol run for communication
with Pj1 . We require that j1 ∈ H since if Pj1 were dishonest, then, as already mentioned above, it is clear that the
intruder could obtain x0 by simply following the protocol. The other two transitions are applied if Pi was called
by Pj2 and Pj4 , respectively, and called Pj3 and Pj5 , respectively. For the same reason as above we require that
j3, j4 ∈ H. All states occurring in Ti1 are initial states.
It remains to deﬁne I i .Wewant to guarantee that Pi rememberswho he called andwhowants to communicate
with Pi . Therefore, we set
I i = {((request,⊥, Pj′), (key,⊥, Pj′)) | j′  n}
∪ {((request, Pj , Pj′), (key, Pj , Pj′)) | j′  n, j < n}.
This model of the agents is more precise than the one presented in [20] where word transducers have been
used instead of tree transducers. While in [20], the nonces (the messages substituted for x0 in T
i
0 ) needed to be
typed since a word transducer can not parse arbitrary message, here any message can be substituted for x0.
R. Küsters, T. Wilke / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 1741–1776 1773
Modeling the server. Since the server S = Pn performs only one receive–send action, it can be described by a
single message transducer, which we call Tn. Formally, Pn is deﬁned by the tuple
n = (Tn, {start}) where start
is the initial state of Tn, with Tn deﬁned next.
The transducer Tn has two states and works as described in Section 7.1.1. In state start, the initial state, Tn
checks whether the ﬁrst request is addressed to S and generates a session key which is stored in the register. In
state read, the requests are processed. In this phase, the register is used to store a session key while moving the
frame to the next request.
The transitions of Tn are speciﬁed as follows:
start(∗,hashKi (Pi , Pn, x0, x1)) → read(vN ,hashKi (Pi , Pn, x0, x1))
read(vR,hashKi (Pi , Pj , x0,−)) → encsKi (vR, Pj , x0)
read(vR,hashKi (Pi , Pj , x0,hashKi′ (Pi′ , Pi , x1, x2))) →
encsKi (vR, Pj , x0),enc
s
Ki
(vN , Pi′ , x0), read(vN ,hashKi′ (Pi′ , Pi , x1, x2))
where i, i′, j  n and x0, x1, x2 are variables which take arbitrary messages, and vR and vN are the variables for
the register and the new anonymous constant, respectively.
This model of the server is more precise than the one presented in [20]. First, we do not need to assume that
nonces are typed. The server accepts any message as nonce. In the word transducer model this was not possi-
ble since (i) word transducers cannot parse arbitrarily nested messages and (ii) they cannot copy messages of
arbitrary size, which is however necessary in the last transition of the server. Second, TTAC’s allow to generate
anonymous constants, and thus, provide a very natural way of modeling the creation of new session keys. The
word transducers as considered in [20] did not have this capability. Therefore, in [20], the server could only
choose from a ﬁnite set of session keys. Since the number of session keys the server needs to generate is not ﬁxed
a priori, this was only an approximation of the server’s actual behavior.
It is clear that with decidable models for non-looping protocols [34,26,5,2] the server cannot be modeled
faithfully since these models do not allow to describe recursive processes.
The speciﬁcation of the RA protocol. Given the speciﬁcation of the honest agents and the server from above,
the RA protocol is now formally speciﬁed by the tuple
({
i}i∈H, {P0, . . . , Pn} ∪ {Ki | i ∈ D}),
i.e., we explicitlymodel the behavior of the honest agents, including the server, by the TTAC-based principals
i .
The dishonest agents are subsumed by the intruder who has in his initial knowledge the names of all principals
and the long-term keys the dishonest agents share with the server.
We note that while in an attack only at most one session of an honest agent is performed, the intruder
can simulate an unbounded number of sessions of dishonest agents. In particular, one dishonest agent can be
involved in many requests to the server, and hence, the length of the list of requests sent to the server in an attack
is unbounded.
7.2. The Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol is a famous public key challenge response protocol (see, e.g.,
[11] for amore detailed description). In our terminology it is a non-looping protocol since its receive–send actions
do not require iteration or recursion.
In the standard Alice and Bob notation the protocol can be described as follows where KA and KB denote A’s
and B’s public key, respectively, and NA and NB denote nonces generated by A and B, respectively:
A → B : encaKB(NA,A)
B → A : encaKA(NA,NB)
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A → B : encaKB(NB)
B → : NB
The last action of B is a challenge output action. That is, B presents NB as a challenge for the intruder since NB
may be used as session key.
We model the protocol as follows: we assume that honest A runs one instance of the protocol as initiator
with the intruder I . We also model one instance of honest B running in the role of a responder with A.
All receive–sendactions canbemodeledbyTTAC’swithonly one state,whichwe call start, andone transition.
Principal A is formally speciﬁed as a TTAC-based principal by the tuple
A = ((TA0 ,T
A
1 ), {start} × {start})
where T
A
0 and T
A
1 specify the two receive–send actions performed by A. These TTAC’s have the following
transitions:
T
A
0 start(∗, init) → encaKI (NA,A)
T
A
1 start(∗,encaKA(NA, x)) → encaKI (x)
Principal B is formally speciﬁed as a TTAC-based principal by the tuple
B = ((TB0 ,T
B
1 ), {start} × {start})
where T
B
0 and T
B
1 specify the two receive–send actions performed by B. These TTAC’s have the following
transitions:
T
B
0 start(∗,encaKB(x,A)) → encaKA(x,NB)
T
B
1 start(∗,encaKB(NB)) → NB
Now, the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol with honest A running one instance of the protocol as
initiator with the intruder I and honest B running one instance of the protocol as responder with A is formally
speciﬁed as a TTAC-based protocol by the tuple
({
A,
B}, {A,B,KA,KB,KI ,K−1I }),
i.e., the instances of the honest principals A and B are explicitly speciﬁed by 
A and 
B. The initial intruder
knowledge contains the names of the principals and their public keys as well as the private key of the intruder.
The protocol speciﬁcation above could of course be extended by instances of other principals or further
instances of A and B, e.g., those in which they talk to other principals. The one described above is sufﬁcient to
uncover the attack ﬁrst found by [23].
We point out that nonces are not required to be typed. The principals accept anymessage as nonce. In fact, the
formulation of the Needham-Schroeder Protocol as described here is as accurate as other formulations based
on models for non-looping protocols [34,26,5,2]. Just as for the RA protocol, in [20] one would have to assume
that nonces are typed.
8. Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to shed light on the feasibility of automatic analysis of recursive crypto-
graphic protocols. The results obtained here trace a fairly tight boundary of the decidability of security for
such protocols. To obtain our results we introduced tree automata (TAAC’s) and transducers (TTAC’s) over
signatures with an inﬁnite set of (anonymous) constants and proved that for TTAC’s the iterated pre-image
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word problem is decidable. Apart from the application to cryptographic protocols, we believe that the study of
TAAC’s and TTAC’s started here is of independent interest.
One open problem is to establish tight complexity bounds for our decidability results. So far, our transducers
allow for only one register. We believe that our results also hold even for the case of multiple registers. We have,
however, not investigated this case, mainly because it was not necessary for our application and because it would
have made the deﬁnitions and proofs more cumbersome. While here we do not allow anonymous constants as
keys, this would be another interesting extension of ourmodel. Our decision procedure for analyzing the security
of recursive protocols has been implemented [30]. However, not much effort has been put into optimizations
yet. So far, even on simpliﬁed versions of the Recursive Authentication Protocol and the Needham-Schroeder
Public Key Protocol the implementation runs out of memory. This is due to the fact that for every pre-image
automata the state space grows exponentially. It is not clear, from a complexity-theoretic point of view, whether
this blowup can be avoided. From a practical point of view,muchmore effort has to be put into ﬁnding heuristics
for cutting down the state space of the pre-image automata.
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